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 Western Sahara has been called “the last colony” of Africa. The territory was 
colonized by Spain in 1884. During the pan-Maghreb liberation period in the 1950s, the local 
population, Sahrawi people also joined the resistance against colonial powers. However, when 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania obtained own independence as nation-state, the 
“Maghrebian dream” ended. Western Sahara has not only been left under the colonial rule 
until 1975, but it has not yet reached independence. When Spain left the territory, it was 
“recovered” by Moroccan-Mauritanian joint control against the Sahrawi‟s will. At the point, 
half of the Sahrawi population took refuge in Tindouf, southwestern Algeria and established 
the Sahara Democratic Republic (SADR) through the leadership of the Polisario Front in 
1976. At the same time, the other half of the Sahrawi were left under the Moroccan 
occupation. Here Sahrawi ethnic diaspora is found.  
 After the diaspora, the Western Sahara conflict became more complicated. Despite of 
the approach by the international organizations, including the United Nations, the Sahrawi 
people have not yet used the right of self-determination and the conflict has not yet reached a 
solution. Thirty-eight years have already gone since the diaspora. While the Sahrawi are 
found in the different political spaces between Tindouf and Western Sahara (Moroccan 
controlled zone), the political opinion of the Sahrawi, particularly the future status of the 
territory, have varied considerably. Not all of them agree with total independence, but some 
might be able to accept autonomous plan under the Moroccan authority. At this point, it could 
be said that new political division within the ethnic group has emerged.  
 Taking the above situation into consideration, I will analyze the relation between 
political opinion and national identity in this paper. With reference the theory “National 
Identity” (1990) by Anthony Smith, the difference between ethnic and national identities, and 
the strength of nationalism are discussed. For example, one Sahrawi man from the Polisario 
talked about other Sahrawi who can accept the autonomous plan by the Moroccan authorities. 
The man said “do they become Moroccans?” In this case, it seems that one‟s political opinion 
can determine his/her national identity. While referring my field work data, the discussion is 
focused on; 1) transformation process of national identity, and 2) dilemma within Sahrawi 
national unity. According to the points, I describe what kind of crisis Sahrawi national unity 
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The Map of Western Sahara and Southern part of Morocco 
 
 
Source: International Military Operations Training Center (28/7/2013): 
http://www.osrh.hr/smvo/Missions_en.asp?mission=MINURSO  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1. General Description of the Western Sahara Problem 
 
 Western Sahara has been called “the last colony” of Africa. It is located in the north 
western coast of the African continent and has almost 266,000 square kilometers of desert 
land.
1
 The territory was colonized by Spain, instead of France like other countries in the 
Maghreb region, in 1884. During the pan-Maghreb or the pan-Arab movement in the 1950s, 
the Sahrawi also joined the resistance against colonial powers and struggled for their 
independence as “Maghreb Unity”. However, when Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia got their 
own independence as “nation-states”, the “Maghrebian dream” was ended.  
 
Figure 1. List of the countries which have recognized SADR 
 
■the countries which recognized SADR as a state (some of them have cancelled)  




 When Spain ended its colonial regime over Western Sahara in 1975, it was 
“re-covered” by Moroccan-Mauritanian joint control against the Sahrawi‟s will.
3
  Since this 
time, many Sahrawi have been displaced to a refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria. Through the 
                                                   
1 UN Data: (30th of June, 2013): http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Western 
Sahara  
2 ARSO is (29th of June, 2013): http://www.arso.org/03-2.htm  
3 Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara in 1979, and they recognized SADR. At the 
same time, Morocco occupied the whole territory including the one third of the southern zone 
which Mauritania had been ruling since 1975. 
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leadership of El-Ouali Mustapha Said, this Sahrawi group established the Sahara Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976 –which is recognized as a “state” by more than 80 
countries in the world (the countries which have cancelled are also included) (Figure 1) and 
also a member of the African Union (AU) since 1981. On the other hand, the others have to 
remain under Moroccan authority in the region. 
 While Morocco and the Polisario
4
 engaged in armed conflict, Morocco completed its 
control of 85 per cent of the Western Sahara territory and built a defensive sand and stone 
berm around the territory by 1981 (Zartman, 2007: 178). The bulk of the mines are also 
buried along the berm, which comprises one of the longest uninterrupted minefields in the 
world today.
5
 As a result of the berm, Western Sahara is divided into Moroccan and Polisario 
controlled zones (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Moroccan Controlled zone and Polisario Controlled zone “Liberated zone” 
 





 After the cease-fire in 1991, the Security Council set up a UN Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to mandate a referendum for a final status of 
                                                   
4
 “The Polisario Front” (the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Rīo de Oro) was born 
in Western Sahara with the hands of a Sahrawi leader, El-Ouali Mustapha Said, and his associates on 10
th
 of 
May 1973. The Polisario struggles to recover total liberty of Western Sahara.  
5
 The Journal of Mine Action (2/7/2013): http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/11.2/profiles/mccoull/mccoull.htm  
6
 Ibid. 
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Western Sahara in the name of the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.
7
 Firstly, 
the Identification Commission of MINURSO made a list of 70,204 prospective voters based 
on the 1974 Spanish census in Western Sahara. In response, Moroccan authorities sought to 
alter the composition of the voter pool by moving thousands of Moroccan citizens (some of 
them could be Sahrawis who were displaced during the conflict or even during the 
anti-colonial struggle) to Western Sahara and asking their voting applications to the 
Commission (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 618). This event made it much more complicated to 
figure out “who is Sahrawi?” and “who has a right to vote?” Furthermore, even though James 
Baker, who was appointed as personal envoy of the secretary-general in March 1997 to 
conciliate the two parties, suggested several peace plans,
8
 including the third option as an 
autonomy plan under Moroccan regime, Morocco and the Polisario could not reach a final 
agreement. As a result of the voter identification issue and disagreement of the vote condition, 
the referendum has still not been carried out.  
 The territories are also a rich repository of natural resources, for example one of the 
biggest amount of phosphate in the world and offshore. At the same time, it is well known 
about the possibility of oil and natural gas exploitation. Not only the economic interest, but 
also the political reason –Moroccan nationalism is based on the “myth” of “re-covering” the 
lost territory “Moroccan Sahara” (Western Sahara)– it is not easy for the Moroccan 
government to compromise for a solution. Furthermore, because of geo-political interest for 
the superpower states, particularly the United States and France, Morocco has continued the 
occupation without strong pressure from international community. Though it has been more 
than 35 years since the Sahrawi‟s diaspora, the situation has not changed and Western Sahara 
still remains as “the last colony” in Africa.  
 
2. Research motivation 
 
 It was 2005 when I visited Morocco for the first time. I was impressed by the great 
                                                   
7
  According to chapter 5 of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV ), “[i]mmediate steps shall 
be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained 
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or 
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, 
creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom”. United Nations 
Webpage (6/7/2013): http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml The right of 
self-determination of Sahrawi is recognized since 1963.  
8 “Baker Plan I” was made in 2001 which proposed a period of several years of autonomy of 
the Western Sahara under provisions of Moroccan sovereignty. It was rejected by Algeria and 
the Polisario. Then, The Security Council unanimous decision (resolution 1495, July in 2003) 
was reached with the “Baker Plan II” which was surprisingly accepted by the Polisario; 
however, Moroccan side refused because they feared the result of the referendum (Shelly, 
2003). In an attempt of evading the plan, Morocco presented in December 2003 a project for 
the creation of the “Autonomous Region of Sahara” which is the first project of autonomy that 
Morocco has officially presented. At the time, Baker was resigned from the project (Miguel, 
2006: 1).  
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nature of Atlas which gives various colors in the field, beautiful mosaic art at the very 
traditional designed mosque, warm hospitality from the local people and children‟s bright 
eyes just like the sun in Maghreb. While discovering Moroccan attractions as a tourist, I also 
encountered the “Moroccan map” which is very different from what I had seen in other places. 
Figure 3 is the one commonly used in the world. It is issued by the United Nations. On the 
other hand, figure 4 is the one which the Moroccan authorities have issued. There is no border 
between Morocco and Western Sahara on the map. Not only has the United Nations listed 
Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory,
9
 but also no single state in the world has 
recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara so far. Thus, how could the border 
disappear in the Moroccan map? I was surprised because I believed the world map should be 
the same everywhere in the world. Is it possible to have different border lines? How can it 
happen? These questions from the map gave me an interest to know about the meaning of the 
border between Morocco and Western Sahara.  
 








3. Research Question 
 
 According to the reasons above, I began to research on the Western Sahara issue, 
particularly to know what the problem is. I focused on the causes and features of the Western 
Sahara problem from the historical background, regional (Maghreb area) and international 
                                                   
9 The United Nations and Decolonization (1st of July, 2013): 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml  
10 UN Data (30 of June, 2013): http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=MOROCCO  
11 Kingdom of Morocco (1/7/2013): http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/map-morocco#  
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geo-political aspects, international law status and internal socio-political condition of 
Morocco. It shows the complicated character of the Western Sahara issue. After the Madrid 
Accords,
12
 the Sahrawi were faced with “ethnic diaspora”. Almost 50,000 Sahrawi crossed 
the border for Tindouf in the southwestern Algeria, and the others remained in Western Sahara 
with Moroccan rule. After 38 years of diaspora it seems that the opinions about the issue, 
particularly the future status of the territory, vary considerably amongst the Sahrawi. Not all 
of them agree with total independence, some might be able to accept autonomy under the 
Moroccan authority as a solution. At this point, I could say that a new political division within 
the ethnic group has emerged.  
 Now I must focus on what “national” and “ethnic” identities are. Who is Sahrawi? 
Who is Moroccan? During my last fieldwork, I encountered an interesting conversation with a 
man from SADR. I told him that I heard some Sahrawi, who live in Laayoune,
13
 are ready to 
accept autonomy solution under Moroccan sovereignty. The man was disappointed and said 
“do they become Moroccans?” His reaction has an interesting point. For him, if the Sahrawi 
accept the autonomy solution, the person is no longer Sahrawi. Needless to say, whether the 
Sahrawi accepts it or not, he/she is still “ethnically” Sahrawi. But he/she might not be seen as 
Sahrawi by others due to his/her political opinions, because the others might think he/she 
breaks faith with the Sahrawi‟s “national” goal as independence. Is it possible to say that 
one‟s political opinion could change its “national” identity? If the answer were yes, what is 
the cause to shift one‟s “national” identity? This is the point which I want to figure out with 
the case of the Western Sahara problem in this thesis.  
 
4. Who is Sahrawi? 
 
 Before I go to the discussion, it is important to understand the history of the Sahrawi 
people. Archaeologists have found depicted animals in Neolithic rock drawings in Western 
Sahara. It is estimated to have been drawn between 5000 and 2500 B.C. by people who are 
known as Bafour (Hodges, 1983a: 3). During the course of the first millennium B.C., 
Tamazight nomads came to Western Sahara from the north and started to control the remnants 
of Bafour. After the first Arab expeditions to the Maghreb region, some of the Tamazight were 
converted to Islam (Hodges, 1983a: 4). Though very few Arabs had settled in the Maghreb in 
the seventh century, a series of invasions by Arab Bedouin in the thirteen century brought 
many settlers. One of them, Benī Hassan from Yemen, began migrating southward into the 
                                                   
12 Spain decided to abandon Western Sahara and it was divided by Morocco (two-third of the 
northern territory) and Mauritania (one-third of the southern territory). These three states 
agreed with the Accords in 1975 just before the death of General Francisco Franco. 
13 Laayoune is the capital city of Western Sahara. It is economically and administratively 
controlled by Moroccan authority and it has95 per cent of the whole population of the province, 
241,045 in 2010. Royaume du Maroc Ministére de la Santé (3/5/2013): http://www.sante.gov.ma/  
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Western Sahara in about the end of the thirteen century (Hodges, 1983a: 8). Above all, the 
Sahrawi have ancestors from Bafour, Tamazigh and Arab. Since their language, Hassaniya, 
has similarity with Arabic dialect in Yemen, it is believed Benī Hassan gave linguistic 
influence to the Sahrawi (Pazzanita, 2006: 200).  
 The Sahrawi are mainly composed of three clans. Tekna which has a strong 
admixture of Tamazigh blood live in the north, the largest Western Sahara clan, Reguibat, can 
be seen in the east, and Maqil who are considered as ancestors of Benī Hassan live in the 
coast (figure 5). Traditionally, each clan and sub-clan regulated its affairs through djemaa 
(traditional assembly), which consisted of the heads of its most distinguished families. 
Djemaa has often been called into session in time of war or grave crisis to discuss the defense 
or raid (Hodges, 1983: 14). Particularly in the inland where the Reguibat live, conflicts have 
occurred often due to scarce resources and harsh conditions of the nature.
14
 At the time, 
Djemaa had a central role to mediate issues between clans. It has important “political” role in 
the Sahrawi society. 
 
Figure 5. Clans in Western Sahara 
 
Source: Referring Eya (1986: 45). 
 
 How can “Sahrawi” be defined? In Darija (Maghreb dialect), Sahrawi means “people 
                                                   
14 The average annual rainfall is 30 to 50mm in the nomadic land, and it is only 10 to 30mm 
further inland. Moreover, temperature has a large variation, it could quickly fall to below zero 
at night, but also be 60 degrees in the day (Rezette, 1975: 26). 
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who are from desert (Sahara)”. It is used in the same way as “Marrakechi” (people who are 
from Marrakech). The “I” at the end of the word gives meaning of “people who are from”. 
Thus, when people use the word “Sahrawi”, they are not conscious of the borders in the 
Sahara region. Hassaniya is the language which is largely used in the Sahrawi society. It is 
considered unintelligible to the Moroccan, Egyptian or Eastern Arabic on the first contact, but 
“closer investigation this desert dialect is a “purer” brand of Arabic than most outside Arabs 
suspect” (Eagleton, 1965: 46). Due to the nomadic style of life, most of the Sahrawi 
seasonably move a long distance to follow their herds. Thus, Hassaniya is used in a wide 
scope; most of the places in Mauritania, the northern part of Mali, southwestern Algeria and 
the south of Morocco. Although the common linguistic community, same life style as nomads 
and traditional culture are pointed out in the above desert area, there is not a common political 
fate. Therefore, it is difficult to say the Hassaniya population is an ethnic community.  
 However, as I will mention later in this paper, some ethnic communities are created 
by the colonial border. Here I just make sure that whenever I use the term “Sahrawi” in this 
thesis, it indicates the people who speak Hassaniya or wear their traditional clothes (Melhfa 
and Dara), or even identified themselves as Sahrawi, in addition to these conditions, the 
people who are living or lived in both the southern part of Morocco and Western Sahara 
territory, including in Tindouf. It means I focus on the Sahrawi population who was under 
Spanish colonial rule. Of course, I cannot ignore the fact that 80 per cent of the Mauritanian 
population also speaks Hassaniya (Eagleton, 1965: 46), and there are some Sahrawi who 
speak Tamazight instead of Hassaniya in the southern part of Morocco.
15
 Hence, the ethnic 
boundary which I defined above has fuzzy character.  
 
5. Morocco as a multi-ethnic country 
 
 Morocco has a constructed “Moroccan national identity” within the border where 
various ethnic groups co-exist; the descendants of Arab invaders of the eighth century and 
also of migrating Arab tribes of the later Middle Ages, Jews from a lost Andalusia, significant 
number of Tamazight
16
 population (Berber) and Sahrawi in the south (Cline, 1947: 18). After 
Moroccan independence in 1956, state-elite or nationalist has seen ethnic criteria as irrelevant, 
and all Moroccans being equal (Venema & Mguild, 2010: 36). Furthermore, King Mohammed 
VI stated in his annual speech on 30 July 2001 that “national Moroccan identity is based on a 
pluralistic ethnic, cultural and linguistic reality.” (Venema & Mguild, 2010: 37). Thus, it is 
                                                   
15 There are some Sahrawi who wear their traditional clothes but they do not speak 
Hassaniya in the south of Morocco, particularly Sidi Ifni region. They speak Tamazight 
instead. 
16 Tamazight is a plural form of amazight which means “freedom person” in their language. 
“Berber” is named by Arab or Roman and which has comes from “barbar (uncivilized people)” 
in Greek (Ishihara & Shinkai, 2006: 10). Since Tamazight call themselves “Tamazight”, I 
prefer to use this way in the paper.  
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clear that the Moroccan authority has been conscious of the importance of equality amongst 
the ethnic groups.  
 Due to the multi-ethnic character, the spoken language also has variety. Though 
Arabic language has dominated the public space, almost half of the whole population 
understands Arabic and Tamazight language at the same time (Ishihara & Shinkai, 2006: 
12).
17
 Because of a radical reformulation (Arabization) of both governmental language 
policies and state-society relations, Tamazight has been discriminated in the public sphere for 
a long time. At the same time, the integration between Arab and Tamazigh is highly advanced 
in the urban area. Most of the young Tamazight generation no longer speaks their parent‟s 
language. Since Mohamed VI assumed the throne in 1999, he has made preliminary moves 
towards reversing this discrimination. He introduced Tamazight language into public spheres 
and also founded the state-sponsored Moroccan Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture 
(IRCAM) in 2005 (Hoffman, 2006: 146). Despite the above ethnic difference, Tamazight and 
Arab can co-exist within the Moroccan “nation-state” boundary through common religious 
loyalty.  
 Also, I should point out the existence of the Jewish community which has a different 
religious identity. According to Daniel Schroeter, after World War II, approximately 
250,000-270,000 Jews were living in Morocco. They are considered the first non-Tamazight 
people who came to the Maghrib before Arab, and also the large number of Jews from the 
Iberian Peninsula occurred during the Christian Reconquista period. In Moroccan national 
discourse, “Jews are a vital and integral component of the Moroccan nation” (Schroeter, 2008: 
147). Under the sultan rule, the Jewish community is protected as a non-Muslim population. 
Furthermore, the historical relation between Muslims and Jews in Morocco gives diplomatic 
influence between Morocco and Israel. About 230,000 Jews are estimated to have moved 
from Morocco to Israel between 1948 and 1964, which makes up 14 per cent of the 
population of Israel at the time. Also since five of eight ministers from Muslim states in Israel 
in 1988 were originally from Morocco, they might have strong political influence in the state 
(Wigoder, 1994: 949-950). Due to the strong Moroccan-Jewish ties, King Hassan II mediated 
to reach the peace agreement of Camp David between Egypt and Israel. As we see here, 
despite religious difference, Moroccans and Jews are politically united in Moroccan society. 
 Above all, Morocco is characterized as a multi-ethnic state. Thus they have tried to 




                                                   
17 In addition to the linguistic difference between Arabic and Tamazight, the latter has three 
different dialect groups; Tarifit in Rif region, Tamazigt in the Middle Atlas, Tashelht in Sous 
region, High Atlas and Anti-Atlas. It is almost not possible to communicate with other 
dialects, since they have been developed with unique ways in each region. 
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6. The Sahrawi Refugee Camp in Tindouf 
 
 The Sahrawi refugee camp was built in 1975 in Tindouf, southwestern Algeria. At the 
time, the Moroccan army invaded Western Sahara and the Sahrawi population of the territory 
refuged to cross the border. By the end of 1975, approximately 40 per cent of the population 
in the Western Sahara, between 40,000 and 70,000 Sahrawi, had become refugees in Tindouf 
(Farah, 2012: 32). According to the UNHCR data in 2013, the actual number of the refugee in 
the camp is estimated to 116,452.
18
 Due to the harsh condition of the desert –the temperature 
hover around 50 degrees Celsius in the summer and it could be below zero during winter 
nights– Tindouf area is not propitious for either animal husbandry or agriculture on a scale 
which could provide more than a small fraction of the refugees‟ food needs (Hodges, 1983a: 
233). Thus, their daily necessities are largely depended on the international humanitarian aids.  
 Despite the difficult condition, SADR has not wasted any time for “nation-building”. 
The authorities fostered self-management rule in the camp. The camp is composed of 
provinces (wilayaat); Laayoune, Smara, Dakhla, Auserd, each one is subdivided into six or 
seven district (dawa’er) and also each district is divided into around four neighborhoods 
(hayy) (Farah, 2012: 33). Furthermore, each adult refugee is part of a“cell” where they discuss 
about the policy of the Polisario. At the same time, the public social system has been highly 
constructed. Each local committee provides education, health, food, justice, and production 
projects. As a result of its effort, the literacy rate reached 90 per cent in 2005, compared 5 per 
cent in 1975 (Oleynik, 2005: 27) and also more than 60 per cent of Sahrawi women who are 
educated in the camp are working in health and education system (Lakhal, 2012: 50). While 
international humanitarian aid and its concern on the issue are decreased, Sahrawi refugees 
are not only waiting for a solution, but also constructing their future “nation-state”.  
 
7. Western Sahara and “Moroccan Sahara” 
 
 Western Sahara was known as “Spanish Sahara” in the time of Spanish colonization. 
After Spain abandoned the territory in 1975, it has been called “Western Sahara” in the 
international society, including the United Nations. However, in Morocco, it also has been 
named as “Moroccan Sahara”. The names show the political status of the Western Sahara 
issue.  
 This thesis is not going to decide which name is right or wrong. Each person has an 
opinion of the issue and it is also created by his/her own education or historical background. 
The important thing here is how the person reaches the idea. In the international political 
stage, no state recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. On the other hand, 
most Moroccan citizens believe they “re-covered” the territory, not “occupied” it. The 
                                                   
18 UNHCR webpage (24/7/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4861f6.html  
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difference between international and Moroccan recognition come from which fact or 
ethno-history they focus on when they consider the issue. Thus, as long as we judge one‟s 
recognition with viewed right or wrong, the discussion will not go forward. In this paper, I 
will try to describe the individual opinion without considering its justification.  
 
8. Arabic Transcription 
 
 It often creates confusion when we transcribe one language to a different one. In this 
thesis, I have to write some Arabic words into Alphabet letters. Taking into consideration 
Darija (Maghreb Arabic dialect),
19
 I basically refer the transcript style of Abdellah Cherkayri 
(Cherkayri, 2011). The transcription letter will be written as below. However, some names are 
written by general English forms, for example, Laayoune, Tindouf and personal name. 
 
Transcription  Arabic script Transcription Arabic script 
a/ā ا b ب 
t ت th/t* ث 
j ج H ح 
kh خ d د 
dh/d* ذ r ر 
z ز s س 
sh/ch ش S ص 
D ض Dh/D* ظ 
T ع „ ط 
gh غ f ف 
q ق k ك 
l ل m م 
n ن h ه 
w/ū و y/ī ي 
*The three consonants ث ,ذ and ظ are pronounced in Darija as d, t and D, instead of dh, th and 
Dh in fuSHā (Standard Arabic) (Cherkayri, 2011 xxv).  
 
9. Brief Description of the thesis 
 
 The thesis is composed of six chapters. As I have already discussed here, I make 
                                                   
19 Darija is often translated into Moroccan Arabic dialect which has significant influence from 
Tamazight language; however Algerian dialect is also considered as Darija (Droua-Hamdani, 
Selouani and Boudraa, 2010: 158) Thus, I use Darija as broader meaning, Maghreb Arabic 
dialect. 
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clear the purpose of the paper; to investigate Sahrawi national identity and political opinion 
toward the Western Sahara problem, and the definition of the some key words, like Sahrawi 
and Western Sahara in chapter one. In the next chapter, I will explain the complicated 
character of the Western Sahara problem, including the Spanish colonial history, international 
legal aspects related to the right of Sahrawi self-determination and the Advisory Opinion by 
ICJ, geo-political interests from the great powers during the cold war and the role of the 
United Nations. After clarifying the character of the problem, I move on to explain the 
theoretical framework which I use in this paper. I will focus on national identity theory by 
Anthony Smith “National Identity (1991)”. Before going into the theoretical argument, I will 
define the key words, like ethnie, nation and state. Based on these definitions, the character of 
national identity and its transformation process are presented in the third chapter.  
 Then, the discussion goes to the methodological section in the fourth chapter. The 
method which I used in my fieldwork is mainly individual interviewing and focus group 
interviewing. After explaining the definition and uses of interview method, I discuss interview 
discourse, particularly the process of recontexualization and re-presentation. At the same time, 
I explain the detail of my fieldwork, for example, the location, the method of recruiting 
informants, and the contents of the interview discussion. In chapter five, I will analyze the 
interview data, with referring the relation between passport and national identity, the meaning 
of traditional clothes and ethnic identity, and a dilemma in the Sahrawi national unity. Finally, 
based on the theory and analysis, I will discuss the main theme which is if political opinion 
can change one‟s national identity or not, and if so, what is the cause to shift one‟s national 
identity? With the answer to three questions, in the final chapter, I conclude this paper with 
the discussion about a possibility to create a society of peaceful co-existence in the Maghreb 
region through the mechanism of national identity transformation. 
 
 
Fish market in Sidi Ifini 
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Chapter 2. What is the Western Sahara Problem? –Its Historical Background and the 
Complicated Aspects of the Issue- 
 
What is the Western Sahara problem? Why are the Sahrawi still struggling for their 
independence in the middle of the great desert? We must know how this problem occurred 
and what the causes are. We will discuss the brief historical background from the end of the 
19
th
 century -when Spain colonized Western Sahara territory- to 1975 -when Western Sahara 
was “recovered” by Morocco and Mauritania. Secondly, we will consider the Western Sahara 
problem in relation to international legal aspect. Particularly, we will focus on the priorities of 
self-determination and territorial integrity. Then we will examine the complicated character of 
the problem, for example, the geopolitical issues in the Maghreb region, the great power 
influence during the cold war period and its economic interests. At the end of this chapter, we 
will consider the current situation of the Sahrawi and the role of the United Nations. 
 
2.1. Background of the Western Sahara Problem: Brief History of the Spanish Colonial 
Time 
 
Western Sahara was colonized by Spain, rather than France which colonized most of 
the Maghreb region (The northern part of Morocco and Ifni were also colonized by Spain). 
Why was Spain eager to obtain exactly this territory? Furthermore, what was the purpose to 
continue colonial rule there after the ending of the other colonies? We will briefly discuss the 
Spanish colonial history of Western Sahara in this section. 
1492, this is one of the most remarkable years for Spanish history. There were two 
historical events that happened in this year. One is the success of Reconquista (the Christian 
movement which tried to retake the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors), which leads to the 
ending of the Islamic rule. The other is the “discovery” of the new continent by Christopher 
Columbus. After these two events, Spain had obtained their “Golden Age” by starting 
imperial domination in the world. In short, the Western countries opened the door of 
colonization in 1492. 
There is not enough space to present in detail of the Spanish colonial history here. If 
we just focus on the topic of the Western Sahara, the important fact is that Spain no longer 
had strong power as an imperial country when the Conference of Berlin was held in 1885. In 
this conference, European countries, mainly England and France, divided the African 
continent as they wish, then, needless to say, the line which was made by colonial powers did 
not consider local situations, for example, ethnic boundaries. These artificial borders have 
become causes for many conflicts in Africa, even now. Anyway, according to the result of the 
Conference of Berlin, France obtained the rule of most of the Maghreb region (France 
officially colonized Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912). However, France 
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had to share the rule of the region with Spain which colonized Rif (the northern part of 
Morocco), Ifni (the southern part of Morocco) and Western Sahara (which is located just in 
front of the Spanish last key point, the Canaries Islands) (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Spanish Morocco and Sahara, and “Greater Morocco” 
 
Source: Mundy, J. (2006) “Neutrality or complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan takeover of 
the Spanish Sahara, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 11 (3), USA: The American Institute for 
Maghreb Studies and the Centre of North Africa Studies, pp.280. 
 
 Why does France allow Spain to dominate part of the Maghreb region? The answer is 
related to the power balance between England and France. England established a trade 
company “the North West African Company”
20
 in Tarfaya (the Southern Morocco) in 1879, 
and it was looking for the opportunity to gain rule in the region. This British strategy made 
France uneasy about the issue of regional domination. After the discussion between these two 
imperial powers, they reached the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 –France 
admitted British rule in Egypt, and on the other hand, England withdrew from Tarfaya. At the 
same time, they agreed with the condition that France has to accept Spanish rule in the Rif 
region due to the British security of Gibraltar (Hodegs, 1983a: 47). For Spain, it was the last 
                                                   
20 On March 13, 1895, Britain and Morocco (Sultan) signed an agreement by which the sultan purchased 
the trading station of the company at Tarfaya for ₤50,000 and Britain recognized Moroccan sovereignty 
over the lands that are between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador (Hodges, 1983a: 36). 
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chance to obtain colonies in Africa after losing all of their colonies in Latin America. 
Furthermore, Spain dispatched Emilio Bounelli (from the Sociedad de Africanistas y 
Colonistas) to Western Sahara for protecting their last bastion, Canary Islands. In 1884, Spain 
colonized Western Sahara by the result of the treaty which was signed by a sorba of Ould Bou 
Sb‟a (one of the local clans).
21
 Here, the artificial boundary was established between 
Morocco and Western Sahara.
22
 
 However, Spain took time to control the new colony. Once Spanish army lost the 
battle against the native force (which was led by Muhammed bin „Abd al-Karim Al-Khattai) 
in Rif,
23
 it created confusion in the internal political role. King Alfonso XIII and the 
government were accused of defeat by its opposition. Furthermore, the situation made clear 
the confrontation between “Africanista”
24
 and Republican loyalist force. This internal 
confusion led to coups d’etat in Rif by the Africanista in 1936 and resulted in the Spanish 
Civil War. Eventually, Franco won the war with the support from the Africanista and Berber 
military unit. In the same way as this victory, Franco could sustain his 40 years of leadership 
of the country. 
 After the civil war, the Rif region was handed to the Moroccan authorities when it 
obtained independence in 1956. The small enclave, Ifni was also integrated to Morocco in 
1968, at the same time as Republic of Equatorial Guinea received independence from Spain. 
On the other hand, Spain had increased their investment to Western Sahara. Why was Spain 
attached to Western Sahara? 
 There are three answers to this question. Firstly, we can definitely indicate the 
various kinds of natural resources in Western Sahara. Not only the rich fishing ground along 
the coast, but also the oil exploration holds the attention of foreign investment. More than 40 
concessions, covering around 100,000 sq km (two-fifths of the territory‟s total land-area), 
were awarded to 11 consortia, involving 19 oil companies between 1960 and 1964.
25
 
Furthermore, we must note phosphate which was already discovered in the 1940s. The 
                                                   
21
 Sobra is a negotiating party to resolve conflict between tribes in Western Sahara (Hodges, 1983a: 12). 
Bonelli was fluent in Arabic and so found it easy to contact with local tribes. He suggested to them that 
Spanish trading posts could be established at the Río de Oro, Cape Blanc and Angra de Cintra, a bay about 
fifty miles south of the rip of the Dakhla Peninsula (most of the coast of Western Sahara). Due to the 
commercial consideration, a sorba of the Oulad Bou Sbaa signed a fateful treaty with Bonelli on November 
28, 1884 (Hodges, 1983a: 42). 
22
 Franco-Spanish negotiations, about the border line between Morocco and Western Sahara, began in 1900. 
On November 12, 1912, the final convention had finally accepted and drawn the border. According to this 
convention, a protectorate zone, known as Spanish Southern Morocco, existed between the Wad Draa and 
parallel 27º40‟ which considered as a Spanish‟s protectorate zone in Morocco, instead of a Spanish colony 
(Hodges, 1983a: 48). 
23
 The Rif War ended in 1926 after six years resistance to the Spanish occupation. The liberation 
movement had inflicted serious defeats on the Spanish force in 1921 and 1924. These blows to European 
pride had led to crush the resistance by Spanish-French co-operative military attack (Pennell, 1996: 234). 
24 Army of Africa which was lead by Francisco Franco later is known as Africanista. 
25  By 1964 a total of 27 discoveries had made. However, because of the territory‟s inadequate 
infrastructure and the low world oil prices at the time, no oil was exploited (Hodge, 1983: 33).  
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Spanish state‟s Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) set up the Empresa Nacional Minera del 
Sahara (ENMINSA) to examine the feasibility of exploiting phosphates in 1962. ENMINSA 
soon presented that Western Sahara had 10 billion tons of phosphates and there was a proven 
reserve of 1.7 billion tons of very high-grade ore at Bou Krā‟a (Hodges, 1983b: 33). In 1969, 
Fosfates de Bou Krā’a (Fosbucraa) was founded to exploit the deposits and Spanish 
government had invested 24.5 billion peseta for the project there by 1974 (Table 1 shows 
Morocco and Western Sahara have the biggest reserves in the world). At the time, Western 
Sahara became the world‟s sixth-largest phosphate exporter. If the project had been continued, 
Western Sahara seemed destined to become the world‟s second major exporter by 1980 
(Hodges, 1983b: 34). It is very clear that the Spanish authorities had large economic interests 
in Western Sahara.  
 
 Table 1. World Phosphate Mine Reserves and Production in 2007 and 2008 (Unit: tons) 
 Reserves Mine production 
2007            2008 
Morocco & Western Sahara* 5,700,000 27,000 28,000 
China 4,100,000 45,400 50,000 
South Africa 1,500,000 2,560 2,400 
United States 1,200,000 29,700 30,900 
Jordan 900,000 5,540 5,500 
*Since Moroccan authority has controlled over Western Sahara, there is no divided data between Morocco 
and Western Sahara. The production of Western Sahara itself is estimated around 1.5 Mt in 2008.
26
 





 Second, we can point out the secession movement in Spain. General Franco had been 
faced with an anti-establishment movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Particularly, “Basque 
Homeland and Freedom (ETA)” was established in 1959. They were strongly against the 
Castilian nationalism policy by Franco and claimed their own Basque nationalism (Spencer & 
Croucher, 2008: 138).
28
 Due to Franco‟s suppression, they began to seek for secession from 
Spain. ETA was not an exception. Their movement shared the common goal with Catalan 
nationalist. Thus, the Spanish authorities were afraid of influence from the Western Sahara‟s 
                                                   
26 USGS Webpage (01/03/2013): http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2001/momyb01.pdf  
27
 USGS Webpage (01/03/2013): 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/phosphate_rock/mcs-2009-phosp.pdf  
28 Basque identity, patriotism and language have been intertwined since the repressive 
language policies of General Franco. The Basque and other minority-languages in the nation 
were not allowed to be spoken or be taught in schools or media. Expression such as “Spain” or 
cheers of “Viva España” was used by Franco to establish Spanish nationalism (Spencer & 
Croucher, 2008: 138). 
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independence could spill over to the Basque or Catalan secession movements. 
 Finally, we must mention the character of Franco authority itself. As we already have 
discussed, Franco was supported by his colleagues, Africanista, who fought together in 
African colony. He could not easily give up from the territories which Africanista were eager 
to maintain. At the same time, it might be his pride as a Colonel of the Spanish Foreign 
Legion to hold on to the last colony in Africa. Indeed, Franco had a plan to lead Western 
Sahara to independence through establishing a puppet regime, instead of “recovering” by 
Morocco. Not only Colonel Eduardo Blanco Rodríguez (the man put in charge of Franco‟s 
plan to guide to independence), but also the officials serving in the Sahara were sympathetic 
to Polisario and hoped to complete the colonial mission with honor (Mundy, 2006: 290).  
 Although there were various reasons to maintain Western Sahara under Spanish 
control, neither the international nor the domestic situation allowed Spain to keep the 
status-quo any more. In 1974, Spain finally announced its intention to hold a 
self-determination referendum by July 1975, after increasing international pressure for 
de-colonization. Furthermore, after forty years of leadership of the country, when General 
Franco‟s death was close, Spain decided to leave the territory by its declaration of May 23. 
The Spanish authorities were unwilling to involve itself in a foreign conflict while a domestic 
political crisis loomed in front. Considering the unstable Spanish political situation as a good 
opportunity to “recover” the territory, King Hassan II announced the “Green March”
29
 (See 
Chapter 3) on the radio and television in October 16, 1975 (Weiner, 1979: 20). Eventually, the 
March succeeded as the King planned and the Tripartite Agreement of November 14, 1975 
(the Madrid Accord) was signed by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania one week before Franco‟s 
death (Weiner, 1979:29). With the Accord, Western Sahara has been divided and re-occupied 
by Morocco and Mauritania. Polisario sought refuge from the Moroccan military force to 
Tindouf, in southwestern Algeria, and established the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR) in February 1976. Therefore, the Spanish role was “officially” ended here. In other 
words, the de-colonization problem, at this point, was transformed to a more complicated 
regional political issue; “The Western Sahara Problem”.  
 As we see here, Western Sahara has been through a different colonial experience 
from other Maghreb states. When it comes to the decolonization process, this division 
becomes further clear. Not only could Western Sahara not reach independence at the time as 
other Maghreb “nation-states” were born, but also it encountered new controlling powers and 
could not liberate the territory. It is because Spain had economic interest in the territory, and 
at the same time, its domestic socio-political conditions did not allow Western Sahara to 
obtain independence. Likewise, Morocco has almost the same reasons –economic interests 
                                                   
29 King Hassan II called for 350,000 unarmed volunteers to cross the border of Western 
Sahara to claim Morocco‟s sovereignty there. The detail is discussed in the chapter 3 (Weiner, 
1979: 20). 
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and domestic socio-political situation– to “recover” the territory. In 1975, as a result of 
matching both Spanish and Moroccan interests, Western Sahara was transferred to Morocco 
(and Mauritania) from Spain by the Madrid Accord, without considering the will of the 
Sahrawi. 
 
2.2. The International Legal Aspect: The Advisory Opinion by the ICJ in 1975 
 
 The Green March was activated right after the decision of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). The ICJ rendered the advisory opinion on the decolonization dispute of Western 
Sahara on October 16, 1975. It is understood as an international legal aspect of the issue. 
What is the consequence of the advisory opinion? What are the causes to promote the 
Moroccan government to conduct the Green March? Here we must discuss the legal 
precedence over the right of self-determination and the territorial integrity which are the key 
points of the advisory opinion. 
 We should consider the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution 1514).
 30
 
Paragraph 2 of the Declaration states that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.” This provision grants peoples to make a free 
choice for their future political status; for example, to form an independent state, to associate 
with an existing state, or to be incorporated into an existing state. Nevertheless, paragraph 6 
of the Declaration provides that “[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” This paragraph examines the relationship 
between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity in the decolonization 
process (Blay, 1986: 442). Former colonies, using paragraph 6, claim to recover their “lost 
territory” after its independence. At the same time, this claim of historical right clashed with 
the right of self-determination of the peoples who live in the “lost territory”. Does the right of 
self-determination take precedence over the right of territorial integrity or vice versa?  
 It is interesting that the decisions of the ICJ do not have a fixed-form in the cases 
related to the right of self-determination and the territorial integrity. For example, Goa was a 
Portuguese enclave located in India. India‟s claim –Goa was taken from the Indian Union on 
the eve of colonization- was justified on the grounds of the pre-colonial Indian entity and Goa 
was integrated to India (Blay, 1986: 466). On the other hand, Indonesia was denied their 
historical claim to East Timor. Indonesia claimed the principle of territorial integrity and 
justified its annexation of East Timor. However, the Security Council condemned the 
                                                   
30 UNHCR Webpage (06/02/2013): http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/independence.htm  




 and affirmed the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to 
self-determination (Blay, 1986: 456).  
 Above all, it is not crystal clear that the right of self-determination takes precedence 
over the territorial integrity. The right of self-determination, as the paragraph 2 shows, applies 
to all “peoples”
32
 which must consist of a “unit”. According to Takanobu Kiriyama, this “unit” 
is considered as the group which is made by colonial rule in the decolonization context 
(Kiriyama, 1985).
33
 Michael M. Gunter also discusses that “whether a people may or may not 
exercise a right to self-determination becomes dependent largely on the accidents and 
arbitrariness of their colonial past (Gunter, 1974: 152)”. In other words, although some 
authorities had historical “sovereignty” rights from the pre-colonial period, it would be 
damaged by the colonial “unit”. As a matter of fact, Western Sahara was controlled by Spain 
(which was a different “unit” from Morocco under French rule); therefore, the United Nation 
General Assembly of Resolution 2711 decreed the right of the peoples of Western Sahara to 
self-determination and called on Spain to conduct a referendum.
34
 However, since Morocco 
and Mauritania claimed the territory with the right of historical entity, the decolonization 
problem does not go in a simple direction. Then the United Nation General Assembly of 
Resolution 3292 led to request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on certain problems 
relating to the decolonization of Western Sahara.
35
 
 Now we see the contents of the advisory opinion. There are two questions which are 
asked by the Resolution 3292: 
I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet el Hamra), at the time of colonization 
by Spain, a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? 
If the answer to the first question is in the negative; 




                                                   
31 There are three political parties emerged in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The Uniāo 
Democrática Timorense (UDT) favored the presence of Portugal, The Frente Revolucináaria de Timor 
Leste Independente (FRETILIN) advocated independence, and The Associaçāo Popular Democrática de 
Timor (APODETI) supported integration with Indonesia. As a result of parties‟ confliction, with the 
assistance of Indonesian troops, UDT and APODETI established a Provisional Government in East Timor 
(Blay, 1986: 455). 
32 “Peoples” is understood, in the Charter of United Nation, as the political legal sense of a state. However 
the terms “peoples” and “nations” were not made absolutely clear in the Charter who had the right of 
self-determination. In fact, self-determination had become a right to be exercised by the peoples as a whole 
who inhabited a given colonial entity. In other words, it had little practical application for those who 
inhabited the non-colonial areas (to avoid secession) (Gunter, 1974: 150-152). 
33
 There are three meaning of “self-determination of peoples”: 1) the right of colonial peoples to become a 
state; 2) the right of minorities of a state to become an autonomous state; 3) the right of ethnic minorities to 
benefit from certain collective rights (Archibugi, 2003: 493). Here we focus on the first one.  
34
 UN Home Page (11/02/2013): 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/76/IMG/NR034976.pdf?OpenElement  
35
 UN Home Page (03/03/2013): 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/94/IMG/NR073894.pdf?OpenElement   
36
 International Court of Justice (11/02/2013): http://www.icj-cij.org/  
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The court decided as below after considering the documents which were handed out by 
Morocco, Mauritania and Spain. For the first question, the court mentioned that Western 
Sahara was occupied by the consent of the inhabitants which had a social and political 
organization by means of a public agreement, even though colonization is usually justified 
with the doctrine of discovery (Tully, 2000: 54). Thus, it was concluded –voted 13 to 2– that 
Western Sahara was not terra nullius in 1884. 
 The next question made the issue much more complicated, due to the word “legal 
ties”. What is the meaning for that? Paragraph 84 of the advisory opinion said “the meaning 
of the expression „legal ties‟ in Question II has to be found rather in the object and purpose of 
General Assembly Resolution 3292”. The object of the Resolution 3292 was to guide the 
further process of decolonization of the territory. Then paragraph 85 provides that “the Court 
cannot accept the view that the legal ties/…/were limited to ties established directly with the 
territory/…/ since legal ties are normally established in relation to people”. According to these 
paragraphs, it seems that “legal ties” do not mean merely territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, 
paragraph 94 showed that “[n]o rule of international law/…/ requires the structure of a State 
to follow any particular pattern, as is evident from diversity of the forms of State found in the 
world today”; therefore, the ICJ justified the Moroccan claim which “the Court should take 
account of the special structure of the Sherifian State.”  
 The Moroccan claim to “legal ties” is based on; 1) an alleged immemorial possession 
of the territory, 2) characters of Moroccan government, makhzan, 3) the international acts 
(Smith, 1977: 135-136).
37
 We focus on the second question because it illustrates two aspects 
of the ICJ‟s decision. As we discussed above, Morocco claimed the special structure of the 
Sherifian State.
38
 It means that features of the State are founded on “the common religious 
bound of Islam existing among the peoples and on the allegiance (bay’a) of various tribes to 
the Sultan, through their caids or sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory (Paragraph 
95)”. In Islam, sovereignty is conferred by a population‟s bay’a (pledge of allegiance), given 
by tribal, communal or religious leaders in the name of their communities, to a sultan (Weiner, 
1979: 21). On this point, the ICJ agreed that “the settled Tekna, established in southern 
Morocco, acknowledged their political allegiance to the Sultan” in paragraph 100. We must 
remember that this part of southern Morocco was under Spanish control as a protectorate zone 
until 1957. Thus, if we consider the colonial “unit”, southern Morocco, between the Wādī 
                                                   
37 Morocco relied on the international acts; 1) certain treaties concluded with Spain, the United States, and 
the Great Britain between 1767 and 1861 which dealt with the safety of persons shipwrecked on the coast 
of Wad Noun or its vicinity; and, 2) certain bilateral treaties whereby Great Britain, Spain, France and 
Germany were said to have recognized that Moroccan sovereignty extended as far as Cape Bojador or the 
boundary of the Rio de Oro (Smith, 1977: 135).  
38
 Morocco also claims their entity of Western Sahara with referring the Eastern Greenland case. In this 
case, the ICJ justifies historical entity of Denmark due to the continued display of authority with the 
unsettled population in an extreme environment. Western Sahara is thinly unpopulated great desert where 
nomads live with extreme condition. The population was estimated not more than 100,000 for the 102,703 
square mile territory in 1979 (Weiner, 1979: 20).  
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Dar‟a and parallel 27º40‟, is understood as a part of the Spanish “unit”.  
 Finally, the ICJ concluded that rejecting Morocco‟s claim of sovereignty based on 
geographical contiguity –title of contiguity understood as a basis of territorial sovereignty 
(Smith, 1977: 159). Paragraph 151, however, provides that “[t]he language employed by the 
General Assembly in Question II does not appear to the Court to confine the question 
exclusively to those legal ties which imply territorial sovereignty”, “legal ties” is not limited 
to territorial sovereignty. As a result, Morocco stretched the point –the ICJ agreed their 
sovereignty based on “legal ties” with allegiance (as paragraph 100 shows above), and 
“recovered” the Western Sahara just after the ICJ‟s decision. Here we can point out the 
ambiguous aspect of the word “legal ties” of the advisory opinion, which made confusion 
between the Western value of “sovereignty” and Islamic or cultural based “sovereignty”, and 
therefore, has left some unsolved questions. 
 
 
2.3. The Hegemony Dispute in the Maghreb and the Cold War: Economic Interest 
Versus Regional Strategy 
 
 The Western Sahara problem is deeply related to the hegemony dispute within the 
Maghreb region. After the Madrid Accord, Morocco started to establish its rule in Western 
Sahara. On the other hand, Algeria supported the right of self-determination for Sahrawi and 
allowed the Polisario to build a refugee camp inside their territory. Although the risk for a 
Maghreb regional conflict was very high in the 1970s and 1980s, it was successfully avoided. 
Why did the status quo remain? The answer can be found in the geopolitical and economic 
interests in the region by the super powers. We will now analyze the complicated relations 
between the hegemonic countries in Maghreb –Morocco and Algeria– and the super powers –
the United States and the Soviet Union– during the Cold War era in this section. 
 Firstly, we must recognize the background of the Maghreb Union which was 
discussed by representatives from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (which was struggling for 
independence at the time) in Tangier in 1958. Though all of them had agreed to establish the 
Arab Maghreb Union after gaining their independence, they failed to achieve the plan. One of 
the causes of the failure was an unsolved border issue. Due to the idea of the “Greater 
Morocco” (Figure 6)
39
, Morocco had not recognized its southeastern border with Algeria. 
Then it led to the conflict in the region of Tindouf in 1963, “the War of the Sands”, just after 
                                                   
39 Allal el-Fassi, the principal leader of the Istiqlal Party, argued that “[i]f Morocco is independent, it is not 
completely unified. The Moroccans will continue the struggle until Tangier, the Sahara from Tindouf to 
Colomb-Bechar, Touat, Kenadza, Mauritania are liberated and unified. Our independence will only be 
complete with the Sahara!” in 1956. Later, his cousin „Abd el-kebir el-Fessi drew a map of Greater 
Morocco, which was published in the Istiqlal Party‟s daily newspaper, Al-Alam (Hodges, 1983a: 85). 




 Here we must mention that the clash between Morocco and Algeria 
had started after building their own sovereign “nation-states”. 
 Although the border clash showed an unstable relation between Morocco and Algeria, 
they had agreed on the future status of Western Sahara until 1975. At an Arab League summit 
in Rabat, in October 1974, Hassan II and the Mauritanian President Mohktar Ould Daddah 
reached an agreement to divide Western Sahara –annexing the southern third evacuated by 
Mauritania– with the blessings of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne (Mundy, 2006: 
282). A Joint 4 July communiqué –approved by both Hassan II and Boumedienne in 1975– 
also shows that the Algerian government agreed not to oppose the ambition of Rabat and 
Nouakchott in Western Sahara, in exchange for Moroccan favor toward ratification of a 1972 
Algerian-Moroccan border treaty (Mundy, 2006: 282). However, Algeria eventually opposed 
the plan and once again strongly supported the Sahrawi‟s right of self-determination before 
the ICJ at the end of the same month. Why did Algeria return to their first policy? 
 Algeria itself was a country which obtained independence through a bloody war 
against a colonial power -France. As a result of the struggle, Algeria built its international 
reputation on the revolutionary legitimacy and also its leading role within the Non-Aligned 
Movement in the 1970s. Thus, they stood on the point that self-determination is the path to 
legitimate independent statehood (Joffé, 2010: 377). On the other hand, it has often been 
suggested that Algeria‟s desire for an Atlantic port has motivated its pro-independent Sahara 
policy.
41
 Such a port would be a cause for easy export of the iron ore at Garet Djebilet, near 
Tindouf (Mundy, 2006: 281). Likewise, if we consider the economic aspect, Algeria does not 
welcome Moroccan economic growth by obtaining one of the biggest phosphate mines at Bou 
Krā‟a. Furthermore, Algeria is cautious about Moroccan expansionism; the idea of the Greater 
Morocco. We should not forget that Morocco also claims its historical right to the 
southwestern part of Algeria, which was not completely solved at that time. Above all, we 
cannot deny that Algeria regards Morocco as a regional threat. 
 Algeria‟s official position, however, has insisted that the conflict in Western Sahara is 
the sole responsibility of the United Nations and outside of Algerian-Moroccan bilateral 
relations (Zoubir & Benadballah-Gambier, 2006: 196). On the other hand, Morocco claims 
that the Polisario is not an indigenous movement of the people of Western Sahara but consists 
entirely of Algerian mercenaries; therefore the conflict is between Morocco and Algeria, not 
with the Polisario. Indeed, an Algerian-Moroccan war broke out in January 1976. Violent 
                                                   
40 In the early summer of 1963, Morocco claims sovereignty over part of the Algerian Sahara, then in July, 
both countries began military build-ups in the region of Tindouf. This led to a border conflict between the 
states. Fortunately, the conflict was halted thanks to the mediation of some African and Arab states. The 
Bamako conference of 29-30 October resulted in a ceasefire agreement which was signed on 2 November 
(Stora, 2007: 24). 
41
 However, this point would not be concerned if we considered of the Algerian gas pipeline to Spain going 
through northern Morocco, which pays Rabat in free gas. According to this fact, it is possible that Algeria 
could gain Atlantic access through southern Morocco (Mundy, 2006: 281). 
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clashes took place between the two armies at Amgala, on the border city. Although the 
conflict ended in the middle of February, the relationship did not go in the direction of 
improvement. On the contrary, after the proclamation of the SADR, Algeria recognized it as 
the new government, and finally this led Morocco to break off diplomatic relations with their 
neighborhood in March. According to this fact, it is indicated that the regional hegemonic 
dispute between Morocco and Algeria is deeply related to the Western Sahara problem. 
 Next, we must discuss why this regional dispute had not led to a serious armed 
conflict between Morocco and Algeria, though it has twice resulted in border conflicts. The 
reason for this is related to regional strategies of the super powers under the Cold War. 
Morocco is one of the United States‟ oldest allies (actually, Morocco is the first country who 
recognized the independence of the United States of America in 1777). Since its independence, 
Moroccan policies have been pro-Western and heavily aligned with French and American 
interests in Africa and the Middle East. On the other hand, the Algerian regime has chosen the 
direct opposition against many of the West‟s Cold War policies in Africa, especially those of 
France and the United States. Though Algeria imported arms and became a major purchaser 
of the Soviet Union, it has kept its economic interests to the West (Mundy, 2006: 278). These 
geopolitical and economic relations between the super powers and the Maghreb region have 
impacts on the Western Sahara conflict. 
 The American influence on the agreement of the Madrid Accord is often pointed out. 
Jacob Mundy said that the goal for American policy toward the Western Sahara crisis in 1975 
was to “help Spain get out with minimal loss of face, while facilitating international 
legitimization of the Moroccan takeover through the United Nations” (Mundy, 2006: 
300-301). According to him, there are reasons for the United States to play a partisan role. 
First of all, they were highly concerned about the regional stability at the mouth of the 
Mediterranean. As we have already discussed above, the Spanish government was 
transitioning from Franco‟s regime at the moment. Considering the sudden April 1974 
revolution in Portugal which led to a communist junta, the United States policymakers needed 
a smooth transition in Spain (Mundy, 2006: 277). Likewise, quoting Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, “the United States will not allow another Angola on the East flank of the Atlantic 
Ocean”, they were cautious about Soviet influence on the Polisario after the birth of a new 
government (Mundy, 2006: 279). Moreover, taking the Moroccan socio-political situation into 
consideration,
42
 the US government did not only work to tone down the United Nations 
Security Council resolutions (particularly, 379 and 380) condemning the Green March, but 
also supported  reaching a “secret agreement”
43
 for the march between Spain and Morocco. 
                                                   
42 Hassan II was faced two military-led coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. Under the crisis of legitimacy, the 
King had to share governance with oppositions and to place tight controls over the military, undermined 
labor and student organizations (Mundy, 2006: 280). Also later the Moroccan unions, the Socialist Party, 
and the student movement have been repressed since the Casablanca riots of June 1981 (Wright, 1983: 177) 
43 They have already discussed the joint management of the phosphate mine at Bu Kra‟a; 
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For saving face for Hassan II, the US government agreed with the agreement; “[l]et the 
marchers go into it ten kilometers, and let a token go all the way to [Al-„Uyun], and having 
done this, turn around and go back” (Mundy, 2006: 298). Therefore, Mundy concluded that 
the US government consistently manipulated the crisis and was far from neutral.  
 As the example of the crisis in 1975 shows, the regional stability, especially on the 
NATO border, was an economic issue for the United States. According to its strategy, 
Morocco is one of the important key players in the region. Firstly, the Moroccan regime is 
known as pro-Western and can even permit to use their port and airbase for the American 
military forces.
44
 Secondly, it also helped facilitate the initial Sadat-Begin contacts which 
later culminated in the Camp David Agreements (Solarz, 1979: 293). It means that Morocco 
can be a mediator for issues in the Middle East, particularly the Palestine problem. 
Furthermore, the Moroccan government decided to send their troops to Zaire to protect 
Western interests at the time of the second invasion by Katangan exiles living in Angola. Later, 
they supported the allies in the 1991 Gulf War and sent 2,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. Hence, 
President George H. W. Bush stated that Morocco has a “long history of leaning toward the 
West and the good alliance with the United States (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2006: 
189)”. Because of these Moroccan roles, The United States dramatically increased arms sales 
and military aid to Morocco, from $8.2 million in 1974 to $242 million in 1975. After that, 
additional weapons worth about $500 million were transferred directly to Morocco until 1979 
(Ohaegbulam, 2002: 103). Morocco has received more than one-fifth of all US aid to the 
continent, totaling more than $1 billion in military assistance alone, since the beginning of the 
war over Western Sahara (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2006: 188).  
 On the other side, the United States is aware of the economic importance of Algeria. 
It provides nine percent of US crude oil imports and two percent of total natural gas 
consumption. In addition to this, US firms have won over $6 billion in construction contracts 
in the 1970s (Solarz, 1979: 289). Moreover, the United States regards Algeria as a leader in 
the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC); therefore its influence could disrupt 
Western interests toward the “Third World”. Although Morocco was strategically important 
for the United States, they could not ignore Algeria‟s position. Thus, the US official policy 
toward the Western Sahara issue did not change from neutral status. 
 On the other hand, even though the United States suspected Soviet influence of the 
Polisario, its leaders indicated that they would be inclined, for economic and geopolitical 
                                                                                                                                                               
Morocco owns 65 percent and Spain 35 percent (Solarz, 1979: 298). 
44 The Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, announced the establishment of a US-Moroccan 
military commission and the opening talk for American use of Moroccan military bases during a visit to 
Marrakech in February 1982. As a result, the United States has held on to rights of emergency transit, 
staging, and refueling at the Moroccan bases (Kenitra, Benguerir, Nouaceur, Sidi Slimane and Ben 
Slimane). Furthermore, in November, the US Marines landed at Al-Hoceima, on Morocco‟s Mediterranean 
coast, for the first-ever Marine exercise on Moroccan territory (Wright, 1983: 164-168). 
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reasons, to look toward the West, instead of the East. They rather asked for support from the 
West European democratic socialist parties, not the East European communist parties. In fact, 
the Polisario is the only major liberation movement in Africa that has not received direct 
Soviet military assistance (Solarz, 1979: 287). At the same time, the Soviet Union had not 
recognized the Polisario government-in-exile. Interestingly, this Soviet attitude is related to its 
economic interests toward Morocco. At the moment in 1975, the Soviet Union and Morocco 
were close to concluding an agreement about phosphate trade –one of Moscow‟s largest barter 
deals ever reached with a “Third World” nation. According to their negotiation, Morocco 
allowed the Soviet Union to build a new phosphate mine in Meskala, from which the Soviet 
Union would receive 10 million tons of phosphates a year until 1990 (Zoubir, 1987: 18).
45
 
Needless to say, the Soviet Union could not ignore Algeria‟s geopolitical position. In late 
October 1975, Algeria allowed the Soviet Union to use its airbase during the crisis in Angola 
(both Algeria and the Soviet Union backed MPLA which was confronted with the South 
African backed-UNITA). Due to the Algerian cooperation, the Soviet Union made an effort to 
support the Sahrawi‟s right for self-determination at the United Nations Security Council in 
November 1975 (Zoubir, 1987: 20). In the same way as the United States, the Soviet Union 
also had to stay neutral for both economic and geopolitical interests; figure 7 can explain this 
cross relationship between the states. 
 














































 Above all, both the United States and the Soviet Union wished to prevent direct 
armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria due to their own interests; therefore, the military 
                                                   
45 The Soviet Union was not only interested in Moroccan phosphate, Morocco also imported oil (60 
percent of the country‟s needs) from the Soviet Union at the time (Zoubir, 1987: 18). 
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powers of Morocco and Algeria have been controlled by the super powers through their 
exports. As table 2 demonstrates, the Algerian military‟s capacity was several times stronger 
than the Moroccan one. The super powers considered that the Western Sahara conflict would 
not become a regional conflict because of the overwhelming Algerian military capacity. 
Indeed, the Moroccan military forces have never crossed the border and attacked the refugee 
camp in Tindouf. Hence, the Western Sahara conflict was kept as status-quo.  
 Here we understand that the Western Sahara issue is a key point for the future of 
regional stability in the Maghreb. It can be obviously seen by the establishment of the Arab 
Maghreb Union –after thirty years of the Tangier plan–came just after Morocco and the 
Polisario reached a peace plan in 1988. In other words, the Western Sahara issue drives 
regional security and cooperation. For keeping this stability and their own economic interests, 
the super powers have avoided to intervene directly in the conflict. Thus, the Western Sahara 
problem is not only a regional issue, but also an international question.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of military forces by its import amount (Unit: $1 million) 
 Soviet US France Others Total 
Algeria      
1975-78 1500 0 10 430 1900 
1979-82 3200 0 30 500 3800 
1983-87 2500 240 60 430 3230 
Morocco      
1975-78 20 310 725 360 1400 
1979-82 0 470 1100 325 1900 
1983-87 0 260 310 270 840 
Source: Daniel Volman (1993), “The Role of Foreign Military Assistance in the Western Sahara War”, 
International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict, London: Praeger Publishers (Table is made by 
the author).  
 
 
2.4. The Current Situation of the Problem 
 
 We will now look at the current situation of the Western Sahara issue. The United 
Nations General Assembly first adopted Resolution 2072 on Western Sahara in 1965, which 
directs the Spanish government “to take immediately all necessary measures of the liberation 
of the Territories.”
46
 Since this resolution, the United Nations has supported the right of 
                                                   
46 The UN Webpage (03/03/2013): 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/35/IMG/NR021835.pdf?OpenElement  
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self-determination of Sahrawi. Firstly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) focused on 
the issue. Soon, the divisions in the organization between those African countries favoring the 
Polisario and those taking the Moroccan side became clear and it even led to the delay or 
cancellation of the summit meetings in 1982 and 1983 due to the latter‟s boycott. As a result, 
Morocco resigned from the OAU, while SADR was recognized as a member of the 
organization (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 615).  
 After the failure of the OAU, the United Nations began to take a larger role for the 
resolution of the conflict. When Morocco and the Polisario officially reached a ceasefire with 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 690, it also suggested establishing a United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to set a transitional 
period of the territory and conduct a referendum to decide its future status –independence or 
integrated into Morocco.
47
 However, the long-waited referendum has never taken place to 
this date. The main reason is that MINURSO faced a difficulty with identifying the eligible 
voters –Morocco demands 130,000 additional voters on the list for the referendum 
(Darbouche & Zoubir, 2008: 93). Moreover, not only has Morocco refused to renounce its 
military and administrative presence, but also they have disturbed MINURSO‟s mandate by 
surrounding its headquarters in Laayoune with their police or by interfering with its officers‟ 
contact with the local people (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 616). Although there have been 
proposals to abandon the United Nations endeavor in the Western Sahara by its 
Secretary-General, MINURSO‟s mandate has been recently renewed.
48
  
 In order to break the deadlock over MINURSO‟s mandate, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan appointed former US Secretary of State James Baker as his special envoy in March 
1997. Even though the Huston Agreements could show a certain result that Morocco and the 
Polisario agreed on voter identification,
49
 Morocco did not stay on the agreement, and 
disagreement over the eligible voters –165,000 “Sahrawi” considered eligible voters by 
Morocco but not by the Polisario– prevented the referendum from taking place (Ohaegbulam, 
2002: 95). Baker‟s next approach, a “Settlement Plan” in 2000, excluded the possibility of 
independence for Western Sahara and called for negotiations on limited self-rule of the 
disputed territory. Following this plan, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1945 in 2003, which endorsed the final version of Baker‟s plan.
50
 This so called 
                                                   
47
 The UNHCR Webpage (03/03/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16818.html  
48
 The United Nations Security-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, proposed to abandon the UN 
endeavor in the Western Sahara entirely in 1994; however the Security Council decided to continue the UN 
effort for the solution (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 624). 
49 Morocco and the Polisario had been unable to agree on the criteria for the eligibility of voters in the 
referendum. While Morocco had insisted on the inclusion of 170,000 additional voters, the Polisario 
insisted on limiting the list of voters to the 1974 Spanish census as the basis for eligibility, as the two sides 
had originally agreed to. As a result of the Huston Agreement, James Bakers estimated that the number of 
voters should revolve around 80,000 (Zoubir & Volman, 1997: 14-20). 
50
 The UN Security Council Webpage (03/03/2013): 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/447/80/PDF/N0344780.pdf?OpenElement  
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“Baker Plan II” is based on a modified version of the “third way” (autonomy under Moroccan 
authority) with the notable addition of a referendum after a five-year transition period (Zoubir 
& Benabdellah-Gambier, 2006: 195). Surprisingly, the Polisario accepted this new plan, while 
Morocco rejected it due to the peace and security in the Maghreb region. The Sahrawi 
representative in Europe stated that “the Polisario made the decision as a logical and generous 
act to assure peace and reconciliation with the Moroccan neighbor and the peoples of the 
Maghreb (Zoubir & Benabdellah-Gambier, 2006: 195)”. Although the Polisario made a 
compromise, the Moroccan side did not accept it. On the contrary, Morocco presented a 
project for the “Autonomous Region of Sahara”,
51
 which is the first project of autonomy that 
Morocco has officially presented and with the support of the King Mohamed VI in 2003. 
Despite the United Nation‟s and James Baker‟s efforts, the Western Sahara problem has not 
shown any progress for its resolution.  
 In addition, not only the United States and France particularly support Morocco in 
the Security Council, but also the European Union concluded a Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement with Morocco in 2006 –including the waters of Western Sahara (Chapaux, 2006: 
217). Those facts gave deep disappointment and frustration to the Polisario‟s side, which 
could lead young people to return to armed conflict. As a matter of fact, the Gdeim Izik attack 
(one of the biggest clashes between Moroccan security forces and local population) in 
Western Sahara in 2011 clearly shows the local population‟s anger and frustration. At the 
same time, some scholars point out the link between some Sahrawi groups and Al-Qaida for 
Jihad in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has been recently increasing their 
power in the North Africa.
52
 It seems like we may be faced with huge instability –which all 
of the powers were trying to avoid– in the region, because international organizations, 
including the United Nations, wanted to “forget” the issue and have not really tried to solve 
the question.  
 Above all, since the United Nations adopted Resolution 2072 to liberate the Western 
Sahara territory in 1965, the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi has never used. 
Although the international organizations, including the AU and UN, have tried to solve the 
issue, no actors have really put pressure on the Moroccan authorities to find the solution. 
Hence, the Polisario side has been disappointed by the status-quo situation and looked for the 
alternative solution, such as continuing the armed struggle. Because regional and international 
groups have not seriously faced the problem, the regional stability –which all actors are eager 
                                                   
51 The project does not respect “Baker Plan II”. Particularly, it would only conclude a decolonization 
process in which Saharawi freely decides to be integrated into Morocco, not with self-determination. It 
opposes the demands of international law. Group de Estudios Estrantégicos (14/01/2013): 
http://www.gees.org/  
52 Anouar Boukhars and Ali O. Amar pointed out the al-Qaida-style executions in the city of Laayoune on 
November 8, 2010, when the riots clashed with security officers (Boukhars & Amar, 2011: 220). Peter 
Pham mentioned that the Polisario has become one of the principal pools of recruitment for AQIM (Pham, 
2010: 20). 
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to maintain– has been threatened. 
 
2.5. Chapter Summary 
 
 This chapter has allowed us to understand what the Western Sahara problem is about 
and its complicated features. It is a boundary question which was created by the former 
colonial powers. The boundaries were drawn without consideration for the local cultural ties. 
Therefore, when the time for decolonization came, the boundaries became a cause for the 
conflict amongst new “nation-states” in the post-colonial world. The Maghreb region is not an 
exception. Because the colonial power, Spain, could not play a sufficient role for the 
decolonization process of Western Sahara, neighboring states, Morocco and Algeria (and 
Mauritania) fell into a dispute over the post-colonial status of Western Sahara. At this point, 
the decolonization problem of Western Sahara shifted into a regional dispute.  
 Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the Moroccan and 
Algerian antagonism through geopolitical strategies and economic interests in the Maghreb 
region. Because the super-powers‟ strategic interests did not correspond with their economic 
ones, they preferred to keep the status quo and remain neutral toward the conflict. Thus, the 
Western Sahara conflict has not led to armed dispute between Morocco and Algeria. At the 
same time, the Sahrawi people have not seen the conflict solved. In addition, I must point out 
that the international organizations (the United Nation, African Union, etc.) could not play 
sufficient roles to solve the problem. Morocco is known as a pro-Western regime and is also 
located at the geo-politically important region –the south border of the NATO; therefore, it 
has been able to get support to maintain the “actual” condition from France and the United 
States particularly. Above all, the Western Sahara issue has not only implications for the 
Maghreb regional but also the international community.  
 Finally, it has been almost fifty years since Sahrawi‟s right of self-determination was 
adopted by the UN. Although the Sahrawi are fighting and waiting for the solution, as I 
mentioned above, the external condition of the issue does not allow for a resolution to be 
found. Who can ask them to have more patience? The recent movement –the Gdeim Izik 
camp event and the suspicion of being connected with the AQIM– perhaps shows that their 
patience has reached its limit. If the related states seek regional stability, first they should 
solve the problem inside the region. As long as Morocco and Algeria close the door for 
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Chapter 3. Theory 
 
 Here I will discuss the definition and theory which I have used in this thesis. Firstly, I 
will define the words which have various meanings depending on the context, for instance, 
ethnicity, nation, or the word “nation-state”. Should the word “nation” have equal meaning to 
the word “state”? I shall try to define these key words according to Anthony Smith‟s theory; 
“National identity (1991)”. 
 After clarifying the difference between these words, the discussion will move to the 
impact of nationalism. Why could individuals fight for their nation in the name of nationalism 
at the cost of their own life? In obtaining the answer, I must consider the creation process of 
national identity and the character of the nationalism movement. In this process, I refer to the 
theories at Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith. Then, while focusing on 
the nationalism in former colonial states, I point out the difference between “state-building” 
and “nation-building” in the cases of Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalism. At the end of this 
chapter, I will discuss the possibility of transforming national identity. Since national identity 
has a multi-dimensional character, the national boundaries that have been drawn depend on 
the purpose of intellectuals. The question here is what kind of factors help to re-draw the 
national boundaries. Furthermore, though the national boundaries have a flexible aspect, its 
“sacred” character often causes conflict. The chapter will be concluded with the question 
whether the power of nationalism can create a boundary between the real families or not. Now 




 Firstly, it is important to define some key words which have various meanings 
depending on the context. Ethnicity (ethnie), nation and even state could be understood as 
having almost the same meaning. In this connection, both ethnicity and nation could be 
translated as “minzoku 民族” in Japanese, while “kokka国家” would be the word for 
nation and state. In order to avoid confusion, many Japanese scholars have used Katakana
53
  
when they argue it in the academic discussion. Thus, it is necessary to define these three 
words, ethnicity, nation and state. In this process, I will refer to Anthony Smith‟s theory 
“National Identity (1991)”. 
 
3.1.1. Ethnicity and Ethnie 
 
 Smith defined the conception of ethnicity as a central idea between a “primordial” 
                                                   
53 Katakana is one of the Japanese writing forms. It is often used to write down foreign words 
without Japanese translation. 
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quality and a “situational” quality. A primordial quality of the concept of ethnicity is 
understood as one of the “givens” of human existence which has a continuous character. On 
the other hand, a situational quality is suggested by “instrumentalists” who argue that the 
“belonging to an ethnic group is a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments that are 
necessarily fleeting and mutable, varying with the particular situation of the subject” (Smith, 
1991: 20), which means that ethnic boundaries are fluid depending on their goals. However, 
Smith suggests that ethnicity has aspects of both continuity and fluidity. According to Smith, 
an ethnic group is; 
 
[a] type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of decent and 
historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like 
religion, customs, language or institutions. Such collectivities are doubly „historical‟ in 
the sense that not only are historical memories essential to their continuance but each 
such ethnic group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to 
historical change and dissolution (Smith, 1991: 20).  
 
Before going into detail of this definition, it is necessary to know how ethnie (ethnic 
communities) is constructed.
54
 There are six main attributes of ethnic groups which Smith 
suggests (Smith, 1991: 21):  
1. a collective proper name 
2. a myth of common ancestry 
3. shared historical memories 
4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture 
5. an association with a specific „homeland‟ 
6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population  
With the exception of number 4, these elements are strongly subjective components. The 
mythical ties of ancestry and the land of our forefathers based on “shared historical memories” 
–whether those myths are true or not– are crucial elements in composing ethnic identity. On 
the contrary, objective attributes are also not ignored. When the objective “cultural makers” –
language, religion, customs and pigmentation– gain political significance, such markers are 
endowed with diacritical significance, rather than durability and independent existence of 
themselves (Smith, 1991: 23). Hence, cultural attributes could be seen as objective within the 
context of ethnic boundaries. Above all, ethnie does not have only a primordial quality. It 
could be dissolved or be absorbed depending on the degree of the subjective significance of 
each of these attributes (Smith, 1991: 23).  
                                                   
54 Smith defined ethnie as “named human population with shared ancestry myths, histories 
and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity (Smith, 
1997: 27)” Smith discussed the cultural community as the same way as the ethnic community 
here. He made distinguish between ethnic categories (human population whom at least 
outsiders consider to constitute a separate cultural and historical grouping) and ethnic 
communities (the populations have self-awareness as a separate collectivity) (Smith, 1991: 
21). 
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 However, Smith does not try to reinforce an argument of “instrumentalist” as against 
the primordial quality of ethnie. It is because the importance of antecedent cultural affinities 
in the redefining process of ethnic identities cannot be explained with the “instrumentalist” 
argument. In the other words, it should not be considered that cultural patterns are fixed nor 
that ethnic sentiments are “strategically” manipulated. It is rather needed to “reconstitute the 
notion of collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective and symbolic terms” (Smith, 
1991: 25). I explain it further below. 
 I describe the ethnic identification pattern in figure 8. Firstly, it shows that each 
individual has more than one identity. For example, the Sahrawi as an ethnie are composed by 
various clan (tribal) groups or family units. These family units are centered on individual 
identity. Then, collective cultural affiliations as the Sahrawi ethnie, as Maghrebians (North 
Africans), as Muslims are seen in the form of a concentric circle.  
 
Figure 8. Individual Collective Identities in the form of concentric circles 
 
 The next figure describes, what Smith calls above, “historical, subjective and 
symbolic terms” to construct a collective identity (Figure 9). A collective cultural identity is 
composed by 1) memories of earlier events in the history of that unit; historical term, 2) a 
sense of continuity from the past of successive generations of a given cultural unit of 
population; subjective term, and 3) destiny of that unit and its culture; symbolic term (Smith, 
1991: 25). I categorized these three components as (1) past, (2) present and (3) future. With 
general understanding, the past cannot change, but the future can. The present is influenced by 
the events which happened at this moment. Smith said “traumatic developments”, for example, 
warfare, have power to shift the lines of ethnic boundary regulation (Smith, 1991: 25-27). 
Figure 9 shows an example of the Sahrawi case. Before the anti-colonial war started, various 
clans as “sub-ethnies” had their own units. Although they repeated the battle for the resources 
between them, they kept ties with common language, tradition, culture and homeland (past). 
After the anti-colonial war against Spain and the liberation movement against Moroccan 
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occupation (present), the sub-ethnies have shared common destiny (future) and construct a 
new ethnie, called Sahrawi. The warfare stimulates emotion of the members of the sub-ethnies 
and the boundaries between them are redefined by crisis and fear which come from outside 
the boundaries. This is the case for coalescence, but it is also possible to have a result of 
division. 
 
Figure 9. The Process of the Coalescence of Sahrawi as Ethnie 
 
Thus, Smith said ethnicity “exhibits both constancy and flux side by side, depending 
on the purpose and distance of the observer from the collective phenomenon in question” 
(Smith, 1991: 25). In other words, because individuals have various collective identities in the 
form of a concentric circle, the boundaries could shift depending on which past is chosen to 
be the collective myths, how or from where (which position) the present events are concerned, 
or what kind of future and goal the individuals look for. Furthermore, as Smith said it cannot 
ignore a primordial quality of ethnicity, this shifting is limited within the certain collective 
identity circle. Therefore, ethnie is formalized by both “primordial” and “situational” 
qualities.  
 Now ethnicity‟s image becomes clear. Next, the discussion moves to the conception 




 “Nation” or “national” have been used with various meanings; it could be the same 
meaning as “state”, “country”, or “ethnic”. Thus, many scholars have tried to define the word. 
Here I use again Anthony Smith‟s conception of “nation” and try to define it for this thesis. At 
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this point, defining the word is especially important for understanding the difference between 
ethnie and nation. 
 Smith defined the word nation as; 
 
[a] named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members (Smith, 1991: 14, the underline was made by the author). 
 
This is a very similar definition with that of ethnicity. Sharing historic territory, common 
myths, historical memories and culture matches with the attributes of ethnie. However, the 
latter parts, a common economy and legal rights and duties do not match with it. According to 
Smith, there is considerable overlap between ethnies and nations. He said “ethnic 
communities need not be resident in „their‟ territorial homeland, nor a common division of 
labor or economic unity, common legal codes” (Smith, 1991: 40). Ethnies need a “historical” 
or mythological land as their symbolic homeland,
55
 but it is not problematic whether they are 
actually living in the land or not. The question is whether a symbolic place is still kept in their 
mind to tie their unit or not. For example, Jewish people have kept their ethnic identity after 
nearly two thousand years of diaspora. They trace their founding character to Mount Sinai. 
Although it has a role to retain their religious potency, it has characterized as a myth in the 
sense of ethnic identity attributions. Therefore, the yearning for Zion was often more spiritual 
than actual (Smith, 1991: 33). In short, even though ethnic boundaries are composed by some 
degrees of political aspects which are related with warfare for instance, ethnie itself has 
neither actual political roles nor its own land. On the other hand, nations are expected to have 
actual political power with a common economy with common territory and common legal 
rights and duties for all members. This is the reason why nations are called “political 
communities” (Smith, 1991: 9).  
 According to the above discussion, for example, is it possible to say that Sahrawi is 
categorized as a nation? SADR in the refugee camp has political roles and laws in addition to 
ethnic attributions. Furthermore, even though most of the Sahrawi from the SADR side are 
not actually living in their homeland, Western Sahara, they have a right to manage the “free 
zone” in the territory. It means their homeland is not only a symbol or an imagination that also 
it actually exists. Hence, it can be said that the Sahrawi constitute a nation. But, we cannot 
ignore the Sahrawi population in the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara. Are they 
categorized as members of the Sahrawi nation too? This question will be discussed later in 
this thesis.  
 Here it becomes clear what the difference between nations and ethnies is. Ethnies 
might have political will, but are not politicized like nations. This difference can be seen in 
                                                   
55 It is considered as a subjectively locating the nation hinges on a reading of ethnic history, 
which presupposes links between the generations of a community of history and destiny in 
particular places of the earth (Smith, 1991: 70) 
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the composition of the Moroccan nation. It is composed by various ethnies, like Tamazight, 
Arab and Jewish. They have not strongly claimed to create their own nation as independent 
state or even autonomous nation under the Moroccan sovereignty so far. Hence, those ethnic 
groups are not politicized. On the other hand, the Moroccan nation is based on a political 
movement; therefore, it is politicized (See 2.2. Nationalism). However, it cannot be denied 
that the nation is based on ethnic characters. With Smith‟s word, nation is reconstructed as 
“the ethnic core and integrating its culture with the requirements of a modern state and with 
the aspirations of minority communities” (Smith, 1991: 111). So now I must consider another 
political unit, the state. What distinguishes the state from the nation? 
 
 
3.1.3. State  
 
 The word “nation-states” is often used in the social sciences. It is generally 
understood to mean that the “state” has its territorial sovereignty recognized by the 
international community. The word creates confusion as if nation and state were equal. 
However, only ten per cent of states would claim to be true “nation-states”, in the sense that 
the state‟s boundaries coincide with the nation‟s boundaries (Smith, 1991: 15). In fact, one 
state holds various nations inside its boundary. So, now it is necessary to make sense of this 
tricky word.  
 The main difference between nations and states is found in their aims. The nation 
signifies a cultural and political bond and unites a single political community; however, it 
does not set as their first goal to build a state. Their goal is to obtain security and autonomy 
for their political community. On the other hand, states place a premium on “the solidarity and 
political commitments of their citizens, and on the sovereign jurisdiction of the nation-state 
within own boundaries” (Smith, 1991: 168). It means that citizens are formally members of 
states. Once states are recognized as sovereign states by the international community, they 
could have the right to reject external intervention in domestic affairs to protect its citizens. 
States seek for, in Smith‟s words, “triumphant unison as the sole acknowledged constituents 
of the equally misnamed „inter-national‟ community” (Smith, 1991: 168).  
 It is better to use an example to understand the above arguments. Catalonia in Spain 
is well known due to its strong national movement.
56
 Though there are some nationalists who 
want to obtain total independence as a state, most of the people in Catalonia are more 
interested in autonomy within a state and their cultural parity than independence. It means 
Spain as a state is composed of multi-nations like Catalonia, Andalucía, Galicia etc. On the 
                                                   
56 Catalonia experienced a strong cultural revival in the 1960s and 1970s. A major cause of 
this renewal was undoubtedly the vibrant expression of nationalist sentiment that has surged 
the region over the Franco Regime (Guérin & Pelletier, 2007: 5). 
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contrary, the Basque nation has a stronger national identity than Catalonia case.
57
 As ETA is 
largely known as the Basque separatist group,
58
 the Basque people have struggled for 
centuries against domination by the Spanish government to keep their national identity 
(Spencer & Croucher, 2008: 137). They look for “state-building” rather than 
“nation-building”. At this point we can find a key to open the tricky word. If states could not 
provide equal cultural and political conditions to each nation, the nation seeks for total 
independence as a state to protect their security and boundary of the political community. In 
this sense, to obtain a status as a sovereign state is the most secure condition to manage a 
nation. Therefore, nation is considered as if it coincides with state. Nation and state, or 
“nation-state” is confusing in this sense.  
 
Figure 10. The difference between ethnie, nation and state 
 
 Once again, figure 10 makes clear the difference between ethnie, nation and state. As 
the figure describes, ethnie is based on cultural background which has been influenced by 
political affairs from outside the units. Nation is a political community which has a cultural 
core in the center. State is a “triumphant unison” which has sovereign right. It often has 
                                                   
57 In the Basque, 52.5 per cent of the population exhibits a Basque identity whereas 35.9 per 
cent of the people residing in Catalonya consider themselves as Catalan first and foremost 
(Guérin & Pelletier, 2007: 6). 
58 ETA is known as “Basque Homeland and Freedom” and approximately 200 participants 
were surveyed. The younger and more radical members of the Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV), which was found in 1898 and was the major political arm of the Basque separatist 
movement, split off to the ETA. They have struggled by armed resistance since the 19th 
century (Spencer and Croucher, 2008: 137-138). 
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several cultural cores and ideally these cores are kept in harmony in the union, but in many 
cases, nation does not coincide with the state boundary. Now the key words of this paper 
become clear. Based on these definitions, we move to discuss how to create national identity 
through nationalism in the next stage. 
 
3.2. National Identity and Nationalism 
3.2.1. National Identity: Multi-dimensional character 
 
 Before I start to discuss the creation process of national identity, it might be 
important to mention its multi-dimensional character. As I have already shown above, 
individuals have various collective identities. Similarly, national identity can also be 
combined with other types of identity –class, religious or ethnic– and with other ideologies 
like liberalism, fascism and communism (Smith, 1991: 14).  
 According to Smith, this multi-dimensional national identity is defined by both 
“external” and the “internal” functions. The external function has territorial, economic and 
political factors. Nations need a definite social space which can reveal the uniqueness of the 
nation‟s “moral geography”. Then, based on the defined territory, nations underwrite the quest 
for control over their resources and manpower. Also, nations legitimate common legal rights 
and duties of legal institutions as a political factor (Smith, 1991: 16). On the other hand, 
national identity is constructed by the international functions as well. Nations not only 
socialize the members as “nationals” and “citizens” through compulsory, standardized, public 
mass education systems, but also strengthen common identity through the use of symbols –
flags, anthems, uniforms, passport and currency (Smith, 1991: 16). As a result of these 
functions, “the nation becomes a „faith-achievement‟ group, able to surmount obstacles and 
hardships” (Smith, 1991: 17). In short, these functions help individuals to find their location 
in the world and to define who are their “families” or “enemies”.  
 Therefore, in the process of self-definition, “people have allegedly been willing to 
surrender their own liberties and curtail those of others” (Smith, 1991: 17). In other word, 
intellectuals do not only hesitate to suppress or banish the “enemies” which could not be 
integrated within the national boundary, but they can also sacrifice their liberties or even life 
to protect their “families”. It can be said that the goal of “nation-building” –to build one 
political community– becomes a cause of conflicts.  
National identity is combined with class, religion and ethnic categories. Then, while 
keeping an ethnic core of the most powerful ethnie, the national boundary is created by 
ideological, political, economic functions. Figure 11 shows one example of the boundary 
transformation between Morocco, Algeria and SADR. The first circle describes territorial 
boundaries which are based on sovereign states. I draw the circle of Western Sahara with a 
dotted line because almost half of the states in the world recognize its sovereignty. The next 
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one shows political boundaries under the Cold War situation. As we have already seen in 
chapter 2, Morocco is known as a pro-Western regime and Algeria kept political ties with the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War period. The economic function also draws a different boundary 
as the third circle shows. Maghreb states, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania 
(SADR is excluded), founded the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 for economic cooperation. 
Importantly, the boundaries have a flexible character; therefore, it could be re-drawn 
depending on which functions give determination to the intellectuals. The mission for the 
intellectuals here is to answer the question “who we are”. When they face this question, they 
start to think of true collective “self”. At this point, this consciousness brings them to a 
nationalist movement.  
 





 Now the discussion encounters the important question for national identity 
construction; “who are we?” How can intellectuals find the answer to this question?  
 According to Benedict Anderson, vernaculars and print-capitalism have supported to 
create nations, what he calls “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983: 39). When the sacred 
language (for example, Latin as the Bible language) has power to control religious 
communities, local linguistic differences within memberships were not paid attention. 
However, since a vernacular print-market has emerged within capitalism, the sacred language 
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has lost its status (Anderson, 1983: 40). During the process of vernacularizing, people start to 
think about themselves, who they are and who are not with them. Hence, Anderson says, what 
“made the new communities imaginable was /…/ interaction between a system of production 
and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality 
of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson, 1983: 42-43). Here the imagined communities are 
created as nations through categorizing “us” and “them”.  
 Anderson also mentioned a nationalism definition by Ernest Geller: “[n]ationalism is 
not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” 
(Anderson, 1983: 6). In short, nations are imagined through nationalism. Gellner explained 
nationalism as a process with two different cultural styles. One is “wild culture” that can 
reproduce itself from generation to generation without conscious design or supervision. The 
other one is “garden cultures” which developed from the wild cultures and sustained by 
literacy and special personnel (Gellner, 1983: 50). According to Gellner, there is no sense to 
ask people who live in wild cultures whether they love their own culture or not, because they 
look at it like the air, they are not even conscious of it (Gellner, 1983: 61). Through the 
experiences in an exo-society –particularly through the education which is protected by the 
state authority, people face the difference between school-transmitted culture (garden 
cultures) and their own. Then they begin to be aware of love or sentiment to one‟s own culture 
(Gellner, 1983: 61). At this point, the boundary would become clear and they might not 
hesitate to sacrifice their life to protect the patriotic culture. This is a cause to stand for 
nationalism.  
 Lastly, I want to come back to Smith‟s argument of nationalism. He explained 
nationalism as “the doctrine that makes the nation the object of every political endeavor and 
national identity the measure of every human value /…/ of a world community and it moral 
unity (Smith, 1991: 18).”
59
 In short, nationalism is the identity solution proposed by the 
nationalists who fight to create or protect their own nation (Smith, 1991: 97). As a result of 
scientific development, it becomes difficult to find identity solution in traditional religion. 
This identity crisis gave intellectuals a priority task to find an alternative solution. Thus, they 
re-discover their identities through replacing religious culture and familial education with 
historicist culture and civic education. This is how intellectuals or nationalists create 
nationalism movements (Smith, 1991: 92). Nationalism is “the sole vision and rationale of 
political solidarity today and one that commends popular assent and elicits popular 
enthusiasm” (Smith, 1991: 176).  
 Above all, Anderson, Gellner and Smith have similar ideas about nationalism. They 
defined nations only in terms of the age of nationalism, not the other way around. Also mass 
                                                   
59 Smith defined nationalism “as an ideological movement for attaining and maintain 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential „nation‟ (Smith, 1991: 73)”. 
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public education, particularly mother-tongue, is pointed out as having an important role in 
creating national identity. Furthermore, all of them agree it is a political action. Nevertheless, 
their arguments show slightly different conceptions. Anderson and Gellner argued that nations 
are imagined as “a contingency” (Gellner, 1983: 6); therefore it is considered a modern 
phenomenon. On the contrary, Smith‟s argument is based on the ethnic core. Though he also 
considers nation as “invented” in the modern area, it is deeply dependent on earlier tradition 
and culture. In any case, nationalism is a kind of “civic religion” to create national identity 
and nations.  
 
3.2.3. From Colony to Nation: Anti-colonial “Nationalism”  
 
 After the above discussion, it becomes clear what nation and nationalism are. Now I 
will focus on the anti-colonial nationalism which is related to the Western Sahara problem. As 
it is largely known, most of the borders in Africa were defined by the European colonial 
powers without regard of ethnic borders. Needless to say, these artificial borders have been a 
cause of many conflicts nowadays. What have made it so complicated to build a “nation-state” 
in former colonial states? And what is the key factor in succeeding to create a nation? 
 In order to understand the character of former colonial states, it helps to compare it to 
the one of former imperial states. Japan is one of the most successful cases in nationalism.
60
 
Because of its geopolitical and ethnically homogenous character, Japan was unified in the 
early medieval era. Although the small Ainu and Ryukyu minorities can be pointed out, it is 
possible to recognize Japan as an “ethnie-nation-state”, which means the state boundary 
almost coincides with the ethnic one. Based on the Japanese ethnic community, its national 
identity was created through imperial auspices and samurai culture (Smith, 1991: 105). On 
the contrary, former colonial states are doubly circumscribed; one is the “sanctity” of colonial 
units and boundaries, and the other is the presence of a dominant ethnie (Smith, 1991: 114). It 
means that while they must create a nation within the colonial boundary where various 
different ethnies co-exist, a dominant ethnie should characterize the new nation within the 
hybrid cultural ground. At this point, a dominant ethnie must “re-discover” or create an 





 Here are two examples of Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalism. Before I go into detail 
of these nationalisms, I should not forget to mention the anti-colonial movement, in the 
                                                   
60 It does not mean as a cause for the first and the second of World War. It means the degree 
of the unification through nationalism. 
- 42 - 
 
Maghreb region; which could be said to be “Maghreb nationalism”. Most of the region, 
expect some parts of Morocco and Western Sahara which were controlled by Spain, had been 
ruled by French forces. While other Asian and African colonies had awakened to liberation 
movements, the Maghreb intellectuals were also inspired by the ideologies like “pan-Islamism” 
or “pan-Arabism” and set a goal to build a Maghreb Federation after its independence. 
However, this attempt was not carried out at the time, the intellectuals focused on building 
their own “state” within the colonial borders. Taking into account this case, the anti-colonial 
struggle is not really a nationalism movement with the purpose of creating a nation. Colonial 
intellectuals fought to achieve a common goal of independence from the colonial power, but 
there is no potential “nation” aspect (Smith, 1991:108).  
 Bringing back the discussion to the Moroccan case, its own governmental system 
“makhzan” has existed since before the French Protectorate time. Under the makhzan system, 
there are two conceptual categories; bilād al-makhzan, the land of the government which is 
directly controlled by the sultan, and bilād al-sība, the land outside governmental control 
which has degrees of autonomy from the central government (Wyrtzan, 2011: 229). The 
borders between bilād al-makhzan and bilād al-sība are constantly defined by negotiation 
among the makhzan and various urban and seminomadic rural groups.
61
 The Sultan is 
recognized as a symbolic power through bay’a (allegiance),
62
 and in return, he protects the 
people, who gave him bay’a, with dahir (a royal decree) (Hodges, 1983a: 26). After France 
launched a “total pacification” of Moroccan territory, the balance between makhzan and bilād 
al-sība began to be lost. As a result of the centralization, the autonomous structure in bilād 
al-sība was broken down, and simultaneously the difference between urban Arab and rural 
Berber groups was highlighted (Wyrtzan, 2011: 230). However, when the time for anti-French 
and Spanish liberation movement came, intellectuals united Morocco under the name of “the 
Greater Morocco (al-Maghreb al-Kabīr)”. It was claimed by „Allāl al-Fāsī, a leader of the 
Istiqlāl Party, known as a deeply religious man (Weiner, 1979: 22), to be the area of “the 
Greater Morocco” based on the religious authority of Moroccan sultans from centuries ago 
(see the figure 6). According to the idea of the Greater Morocco, Moroccan intellectuals 
obtained independence in 1956. Here Morocco as a “state” was founded.  
 As most of the former colonial states have experienced, the Moroccan state had 
difficulty in managing its territory which was inherited from colonial boundaries. Their first 
mission was to create a national identity within various different ethnic groups; Arab, Berber, 
Jews, Sahrawi, Christian etc. Therefore, re-discovering or making their ethno-history became 
an urgent need. While the domestic socio-political tension was increasing in the beginning of 
                                                   
61 The regions of difficult access such as the mountains of the Rif and the three Atlas ranges, 
Sahara area were categorized as bilād al-sība (Hodges, 1983a: 25).  
62 Moroccan sultans have been known as the most powerful rulers in the Maghreb and 
respected their claim to the guardianship of Western Islam as amir al-muminin (commnder of 
the faithful) (Hodges, 1983a: 26). 
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the 1970s, King Hassan II announced “the Green March” to recover Western Sahara in 1975 
(see footnote 29). This event had a role to “re-discover” or create an ethno-history for the 
Moroccan “nation”. The King declared his charismatic holiness with the name of “sharīf 
(descendent of the Prophet Muhammad)”. The Qur‟an was the only weapon for the marchers, 
and the King bolstered their belief that they were going forth as mujahhidīn (holy warriors) to 
“re-cover” the part of their religious dynasty which was invaded by the Christian force 
(Weiner, 1979:27). Upon his wish, the number of volunteers for the march far exceeded the 
King‟s quotas.
63
 For example, in Agadir 66,589 men, women and young people volunteered 
to meet a quota of 33,000 (Weiner, 1979: 31). They followed the King‟s march to “re-cover” 
Western Sahara by the name of jihad (holy war). At that moment, Arab and Berber were 
united for one “national” goal. This shows that the impact of the march spreads into not only 
intellectuals but also the whole population.  
 Hence, the anti-colonial “nationalism” in 1956 is considered “state-building”. On the 
other hand, the nationalism based on “the Green March” has a “nation-building” character. 
The King succeeded in making an ethno-history to unify the nation by a symbolic “myth” of 
“the Green March”. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that the Sahrawi‟s will was excluded from 




 Sahrawi nationalism is a very recent phenomenon. Their life is based on tribal 
identity and loyalty, so they had never experienced ethnic unity until the late 1950s. Because 
of the harsh natural conditions of the desert, small nomadic groups had to migrate over a vast 
area in search of pastures for the animals. Needless to say, it was not easy to establish a large 
state structure. On the contrary, there was often inter-tribal conflict about their livestock 
(Hodges, 1983b: 28). However, development of the natural resources, particularly the 
phosphate industry, changed the traditional life-style of the Sahrawi in the 1950s. They had 
begun to settle in the coastal cities, mainly Dakhla and Laayoune, for the jobs which the 
Spanish companies provided.
64
 By 1974 almost 8,000 Sahrawi worked as wage-earners in the 
territory and 55 per cent of the total number of Sahrawis recorded in the 1974 census were 
settled in the cities (Hodges, 1983a: 130-131). Through the sedentarization and encounter of 
                                                   
63 The King set the number of volunteer for each province. In Oujda 11,832 volunteered to 
meet a quota of 1,500; Rabat-Sale 20,018 for a quota of 10,000 (Weiner, 1979: 31). 
64 IPASA, a new Western Sahara fishing enterprise which was invested by Spanish public 
and private capital, built processing facilities in Dakhala in 1948. After that the annual total 
fish catch was notably increased. Although 657 tons of fish were landed in the territory in 
1949, it reached 11,800 tons in 1974. Also the Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara 
(ENMINSA) announced a proven deposit of 1.7 billion tons of ore at Bou-Craa (about 67 miles 
southeast of Laayoune) during the 1950s and began the Bou-Craa phosphate project (Hodegs, 
1983a: 123-127).  
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other “ethnie (Spanish)”, Sahrawi noticed their commonality and began to build ethnic ties 
based on their common cultural background.  
 At the time of “Maghreb nationalism”, many Sahrawi were enrolled in the Moroccan 
Army of Liberation, because this movement had a trans-frontier, anti-colonial character 
(Hodges, 1983b: 31). Nevertheless, the Sahrawi‟s will was abandoned after Moroccan 
independence. The Army of Liberation was replaced by the Force Armées Royales (FAR), 
which consisted of former Moroccan troops of the French and Spanish armies, and then the 
fighters from the Army of Liberation were considered as a potential danger to the monarchy 
(Hodegs, 1983a: 75). Therefore, Sahrawi in Western Sahara had to remain under Spanish 
control and seek their own liberation movement.  
 The new Sahrawi anti-colonial movement came in the late 1960s from a young 
Sahrawi, Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, who received a modern education in Casablanca, 
Cairo and Damascus. While he was teaching the Qur‟an and Arabic in the mosque at Smara, 
he recruited the nucleus of an underground anti-colonial movement, which came to be known 
as the Harakat Tahrir Saguia el-Hamra wa Qued ed-Dahab (Organization for the Liberation 
of Saguia el-Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab) (Hodges, 1983b: 48). The organization was 
recognized as the first urban-based Sahrawi political movement and they set a goal of 
independence for Western Sahara. On 17 June 1970, however, Bassiri was arrested in the 
counter-demonstration to the Spanish government and never reappeared after. At the same 
time, hundreds of supporters for Bassiri were arrested and some people were killed by 
Spanish force at the demonstration (Hodges, 1983b: 48-49).
65
 The liberation movement was 
disbanded here.  
 It did not take a long time to build up a new liberation movement. The birth of the 
second movement also illustrated the role of young university-educated Sahrawi, El-Ouali 
Mustapha Said. Like many other Sahrawis, he was settled in Tan-Tan (part of Spanish 
Southern Morocco) after the defeat of the Army of Liberation and graduated from 
Mohammed V University in Rabat (Hodges, 1983b: 50). He was a member of the Sahrawi 
student collective in Rabat in 1970-2 and the group worked to support the Moroccan 
opposition parties which had railed against the King‟s regime for its collaborative relations 
with Spain (Hodges, 1983b: 51).
66
 They focused on opposing the Spanish colonization. 
Indeed, they did not deny the idea of Western Sahara‟s integration with Morocco at that 
point.
67
 As a result of the suppression by Moroccan authorities, however, the Sahrawi 
liberation movement had to move into their home, Western Sahara.  
                                                   
65 According to Spanish government, 2 Sahrawis were killed. Also Moroccan source reported 
10-12 people are killed in the event (Hodges, 1983b: 49). 
66 El-Ouali and his associates met the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, including Allal el-Fassi, 
and of the UNFP and a secretary-general of PLS, Ali Yata (Hodges, 1983a: 159). 
67 El-Ouali had written a memorandum for the UNFP exiles in Algers, which did not 
explicitly mention independence as a sole goal (Hoedges, 1983b: 52). 
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 On 10 May 1973, “The Polisario Front” (the Frente Popular para la Liberación de 
Saguia el Hamra y Rīo de Oro) was born in Western Sahara with the hands of El-Ouali and his 
associates. The Polisario Front issued a manifesto which said the front is the “unique 
expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the 
means by which the Sahrawi Arab African people can recover its total liberty and foil the 
maneuvers of Spanish colonialism” (Hodges, 1983a: 161). At this point, Sahrawi intellectuals 
united the people who lived in Western Sahara to achieve the goal; independence. Just like 
Moroccan “nationalism” in 1956, the movement was limited almost exclusively to the 
intellectuals; therefore, it is also characterized as “intellectual nationalism” to build a “state”.  
 After the Sahrawi diaspora in 1975, the Polisario proclaimed the birth of the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Tindouf, southwest of Algeria, in February 1976. 
SADR is recognized as a sovereign state by more than 70 states in the world. Recently, Kenya, 
one of the African Anglophone states, recognized the SADR in 2005. Also SADR is a 
member of the African Union since 1983 (Due to this decision of the organization, Morocco 
withdrew from it in 1984). While SADR authorities focus on the “state-building”, they do not 
ignore the challenge of “nation-building”.  
 There were two waves of nation-building in the refugee camp. The first is the time of 
war before the cease-fire in 1991 and the other is the cease-fire period. In the first period, 
these four factors inspired their struggles; 1) a common desire; independent as a state, 2) a 
common enemy; Morocco is replaced after Spain, 3) a common destiny; to survive as 
refugees under harsh conditions, and 4) a common myth “ghazian (raids)”; and a symbol of 
the Sahrawi secular resistance against any sort of domination (Martin, 2007: 569), produced a 
national identity as “we are all Sahrawi” in the camp where various clans co-exist. The visual 
symbols –waving of national flags when the fighters returned to the camp and parading 
Moroccan prisoners and weapons captured in the battlefield– also strengthened national 
identity based on the anti-Moroccan strategy.  
 On the other hand, the visual symbols and the fear of bombardment were ended by 
the cease-fire. The arena to create national identity was replaced by the community from the 
battlefield. The authority focused on two main fields; one is politics and the other is education. 
The refugees in Tindouf are citizens of SADR; therefore, the citizens are members of the 
political cells and administrative committees which can suggest matters to the parliament 
level.
68
 The system is designed so all adults take part in the politics. Moreover, Sahrawi 
women‟s participation is highly valued. They assumed the duty of building institutions, such 
as schools and hospitals. 25 per cent of the seats in the Sahrawi Parliament were held by 
women in 2011 (Lakhal, 2012: 50).  
                                                   
68 The camp is divided as provinces (wilayaat), each with its own governor (wali). It is also 
subdivided into six or seven districts (dawa‟er) and neighborhoods or municipalities (ahyia‟) 
(Farah, 33). 
- 46 - 
 
 Also the authorities put effort into the national education. The growth of the literacy 
rate –it reached 90 per cent in 2005, compared 5 per cent in 1975– is one of the visible 
successes for national education (Oleynik, 2005: 27). This makes it possible to share the 
knowledge of the conflict and the reason why they are fighting. Randa Farah discussed the 
textbooks which were introduced by the Sahrawi Ministry of Education. She said that “the 
school textbooks encourage loyalty to the nation; praise the revolution, its martyrs, and 
heroes; and suppress the memory of tribes and especially old tribal feuds” (Farah, 36). Once 
again, it shows that ethno-history helps to create the national identity, “we are all Sahrawi”, 
by making it clear what they struggle for. In this process, they try to forget old tribal 
boundaries.  
 Above all, Sahrawi nationalism went the same way as the Moroccan one. It began as 
an intellectual nationalism to establish a “state”, then, nation-building came after. The 
important thing here is that Sahrawi nationalism was mainly created in the refugee camp. This 
means that the Sahrawi under Moroccan rule have not received the same nationalism impact, 
at least in the spatial aspect. 
 
3.3. “Oath of the Horatii”: Transformation of National Identities  
3.3.1. Coalition or Secession: Assyria and Ruritanians 
 
 Before I go on to discuss transformation of national identities, I must point out two 
examples of the transformation of ethnic identity. The first is Assyria. Anthony Smith explains 
this example of ethnic extinction; 
 
The goal of Assyria‟s enemies was destruction of her hated rule /…/ but this did not 
mean exterminating every Assyrian. Perhaps the Assyrian élites were evicted; but, in 
any case, in terms of religion and culture they were less and less differentiated from the 
Babylonian civilization they sought to emulate. Besides, the latter days of the vast 
Assyrian empire witnessed /…/ use of an Aramaic lingua franca for commercial and 
administrative purposes following a large influx of Arameans. Hence the ethnic 
distinctiveness of the Assyrians was severely compromised well before the downfall of 




 helps the coalition of Assyrian to the surrounding ethnies. As Gellner 
argued, “an at least provisionally acceptable criterion of culture might be languages /…/ a 
difference of language to entail a difference of culture” (Gellner, 1983: 44). Most of all, use of 
an Aramaic lingua franca became one of the important tools in creating a common culture. 
After a long time had passed since cultural syncretism started, Assyrian ethnic identity 
naturally transformed into the surrounding ethnies. Thus, Assyrian ethnie was assimilated 
                                                   
69 Syncretism is known as a religious term. Andre Droogers said “the basic objective meaning 
refers neutrally and descriptively to the mixing of religions. The subjective meaning includes 
an evaluation of such intermingling from the point of view of one of the religions involved” 
(Droogers, 1989: 7). Here I used it to describe a cultural intermingling situation. 
- 47 - 
 
with others without large difficulty. 





The Ruritanians were a peasant population speaking a group of related and more or less 
mutually intelligible dialects, and inhabiting a series of discontinuous but not very 
much separated pockets within the lands of the Empire of Megalomania. The 
Ruritanian language /…/ was not really spoken by anyone other than these peasants. 
/…/ In the nineteenth century a population explosion occurred at the same time as 
certain other area of the Empire of Megalomania –but not Ruritania– rapidly 
industrialized. The Ruritanian peasants were drawn to seek work in the industrially 
more developed area, and some secured it, on the dreadful terms prevailing at the time. 
As backward rustics speaking an obscure and seldom written or taught language, they 
had a particularly rough deal in the towns to whose slums they had moved /…/ it was 
perfectly possible for the Ruritanians, if they wished to do so (and many did), to 
assimilate into the dominant language of Megalomania. /…/ they (The Ruritanians 
nationalists) deplored the discrimination to which their co-nationals were subject, and 
the alienation from their native culture to which they were doomed in the proletarian 
suburbs of the industrial towns (Gellner, 1983: 59-60).  
 
At the end of the Ruritanians‟ story, they achieved independence. Although many of the 
Ruritanians assimilated into Megalomanian language, they still kept Ruritanian ethnic identity. 
This is because they almost shared the same destiny (discrimination) in the cities and 
Ruritania still existed as their homeland. Furthermore, the Ruritanian nationalists, who had 
public mass education in the cities, stood up for creating Ruritanian national identity. As a 
result of these factors, Ruritania succeeded to transform ethnic identity to national identity. 
 There is a reason to bring up long quotes here. I want to explain the Sahrawi‟s 
national identity transformation with these examples later. The Sahrawi, who live in Western 
Sahara under Moroccan rule, are educated by Moroccan education. Also Darija (Moroccan 
Arabic) is largely used in the public space and the media sources, even though most of them 
speak Hassaniya in their daily life. As long as they are citizens of the territory, Moroccan 
authority provides them equal civil rights as “Moroccans”. Moreover, at least they are living 
in their homeland, which is very different from the refugee situation in Tindouf. Also as I 
discussed above, the Sahrawi nationalism movement originated in the camp. Considering the 
above situation, which destination will the Sahrawi choose? The Assyrian or Ruritanian case? 
The answer will be found later in this thesis.  
 
3.3.2. “Oath of the Horatii”: Corruption of real families 
 
 At last, I will introduce one picture by Jacques-Louis David. Smith points out one of 
his famous political paintings, “Oath of the Horatii (1784)” which is considered one of the 
most significant works in French Revolutionary culture. The Story was taken from Titus-Livy. 
                                                   
70 Ruritania is an imaginary country which is introduced in “The prisoner of Zenda” by 
Anthony Hope (Gellner, 2000: 99, Japanese version). 
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In Rome‟s early days, one tiny state under King Tullus‟s rule and its rival state of Alba had a 
dispute. Each state had a trio of brothers –the Horatii and the Curiatii– which had almost 
equal power as warriors. Then their monarchy decided that these brothers should fight each 
other, instead the entire populations, and the defeated state would peacefully submit to the 
victorious one (Gutwirth, 2011: 1). As a result of the battle, the Horatii won even though they 
lost two brothers. The picture (image 1) depicts the three Horatii brothers who swore on their 
father‟s sword to conquer or die for their homeland or fatherland (Smith, 1991: 76).  
 
Image 1. “Oath of the Horatii” by David (1784) 
 




 However, why are the women on the right side of the picture crying? It is because 
one of the sisters of the Curiatii, Sabina, was married to one of the Horatii, while one of the 
sisters of the Horatii, Camilla, was betrothed to one of the Curiatii.
72
 Despite the ties between 
the two families, the brothers did not hesitate to kill other “family” for their patria. The story 
did not end here. When Camilla‟s brother saw her crying for her betrothed‟s death, he killed 
her, and said “Go to your betrothed with your ill-timed love, forgetful as you are of your dead 
brothers, of the one who still lives and of your country! So perish every Roman woman who 
mourns for an enemy.” (Gutwirth, 2011: 2) This event shows real family ties could be 
destroyed before the unity of patria. With Smith‟s word, “real families can constitute an 
obstacle to the ideal of a homogeneous nation wherever nationalism embraces the ideal in that 
extreme form” (Smith, 1991: 78).  
                                                   
71 Web Gallery of Art (26th of May 2013): 
http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/html/d/david_j/2/201david.html  
72 Boston College: (26th of June, 2013) 
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/his/CoreArt/art/neocl_dav_oath.html  
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 If we return to the Western Sahara case, there are many families who live separated 
between Laayoune and the Tindouf refugee camp. For example, the president of SADR, 
Mohamed Abdelaziz, has a father, Khalil Rkibi, who is one of the members of CORCAS (the 
Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs which Mohammed VI revived in 2006) and is 
also a retired non-commissioned officer of the Royal Moroccan Army living in Kasbah Tadla 
(Pham, 2010: 10).
73
 I would like to discuss how the real families‟ ties influence Sahrawi 
nationalism latter in this paper. 
 
3.4. Chapter Summary 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I define the key words for this thesis; ethnie, nation 
and state by referring to the theory, “National Identity (1991)” by Anthony Smith. Ethnie is 
based on cultural background and its boundary is drawn by the political pressure from outside 
of the unit. On the contrary, nation is a political community which is created by political 
reason, mainly for autonomous status due to security reasons. Most of the time, the nation has 
an ethnic core in the center. If the nation has sovereign right, it is recognized as a state. 
Generally, when a nation seeks sovereignty as an independent state, it is confused with the 
word, “nation-state”; however, there are few states that meet with the boundary of nations.  
 Based on the above definitions, the discussion moved to the characteristics of 
national identity. It is understood as the collective identity which has an ethnic core in the 
center and is categorized by various cultural factors –religion and language– and ideologies. 
As we see in figure 8, one Sahrawi might identify himself as Maghrebian, or with a much 
broader aspect, Muslim. It depends on which condition he based it on. Figure 11 shows that 
the collective boundary shifts into a different shape depending on the economic reason or 
political strategy. Likewise, national identity as a political identity can be transformed into a 
broader or narrower line. It depends on the determination of intellectuals, who can answer the 
question “who are we?”. In short, intellectuals define the national boundary according to 
“why we struggle” and “who our enemy is”. Thus, based on its determination, anti-colonial 
“nationalism” aims at building a state. However, they are faced with the inner cultural 
difference within the state when they obtained independence. At the point, “nation-building” 
is initiated by seeking or even creating ethno-history. We have already seen this in the case of 
the Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalism. Although national boundary has a flexible aspect, the 
strength of nationalism can harm even real family ties. As we see in the picture of “Oath of 
the Horatii”, not only does a nationalist not hesitate to sacrifice his life, but also extreme 
loyalty to the nation (patria) can cause him to kill his own family in the name of nationalism.  
 Based on these theories which I have explained here, I suggest these three points in 
                                                   
73 Kasbah Tadla is a walled city built in the seventeenth century by Moulay Ismail, second 
sultan of the Alaouite Dynasty (Pham, 2010: 10). 
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the case of the Western Sahara problem; 1) Are the Sahrawi composed as an ethnie or nation?; 
2) What kind of future state will the Sahrawi, who live in Western Sahara with Moroccan rule, 
choose, coalition with Morocco or total independence?; and 3) Despite the result of question 
number 2, is it possible for the Sahrawi to keep real family ties? These questions will be 
discussed later in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology: Individual Interviews and Focus Group Interviews 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the methods that I have used in my fieldwork-based 
research. The aim of this study is to understand 1) what kind of political opinions do local 
ethnic groups have for the future status of Western Sahara?; 2) Which kind of national 
identities do they have? Are there any differences depending on the ethnics, individual 
experiences or their social status? To obtain the answers to these questions, I prefer to use a 
qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one, because, as long as my research topic 
includes sensitive and subjective aspects, I must observe the respondents‟ reaction to the 
answers and the ways they express their opinions, not only collecting the answer itself. 
Therefore, I use interviewing as a qualitative method of my research.  
 I will start by describing the general understanding of interviewing, including its 
definition and uses. Then, I will focus on featuring interview discourse through conceptions of 
recontextualization and re-presentation. Taking into consideration these aspects of the method, 
I explain concretely how I conduct my fieldwork, for example, the settings of the interviews, 
how I recruit the respondents and the role of the moderator.  
 
4.1. Interviews 
4.1.1. What are Interviews? 
 
 The aim of this section is to explore the effectiveness and different uses of 
interviewing as a data collecting strategy. To understand something about people‟s activities 
and attitudes, the best way of finding out it is to ask them. This direct contact provides 
interaction between participants, and these encounters create vox populi (Brenner, Brown & 
Canter, 1985: 2). According to Holstein and Gubrieum, in any type of interview, “there is 
always an image of the research subject lurking persons placed in the role of interview 
respondent” and particularly in a traditional approach, “subjects are basically conceived as 
passive vessels of answer for experiential questions put to respondents by interviewers” 
(Hosterin & Gubrieum, 1999: 108). It means that the putative agent stands behind the 
participants. The agent can be the society, the agency, the tribe, the clan, the family, the 
community or the monarch that is held practically and morally responsible for the participants‟ 
words and actions (Gubrieum & Holstein, 1999: 24). The subjects, who are considered as 
individuals, are not only “individuals” but at the same time engaged in epistemological 
agency –which can be understood as an invisible “repository”. This is the reason why the 
result is passive communication. On the contrary, in active interviewing, the interview and its 
participants are considered to be constantly developing. Since the interview setting is decided 
by the participants –when the interviews are conducted, how to select respondents, what the 
topic is, and how to interpret the responses-, interviewing itself is a consisted active project 
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for producing meaning (Holstein & Gubrieum, 1999: 113). Thus, the interaction among 
interviewers and respondents contribute to producing knowledge.  
 Above all, although the participants could not be totally independent from their 
agency, I consider, depending on the interview setting, that interviews also can have active 
function to produce data. Therefore, interviewing technique is largely used to generate 
empirical data about the socio-political world, particularly in the cases when qualities are 
needed to be identified.  
 
4.1.2. Interview Methods 
 
 I used two types of interviews; individual interviews and focus group interviews. 
Although I was planning to conduct only focus group interviews, for security reason, it was 
difficult to create the situation for focus group interviews in the ongoing conflict region. Thus, 
I combine the two interviewing methods.   
 David L. Morgan, Jenny Kitzinger and Rosaline S. Barbour agree that the main 
purpose for focus groups is the use of interaction in order to generate data (Morgan, 1998a: 57, 
Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 4). Focus groups are group discussions which explore a specific 
set of issues by debating a set of questions. It encourages the participants to talk to each other 
by asking questions, exchanging anecdotes, and commenting on each others‟ experiences and 
points of view (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999:4). Claire Waterton and Brian Wynne state the 
definition of focus groups as “a methodology for ascertaining community attitudes (Waterton 
& Wynne, 1999: 127)” They believe that people express themselves in a relational manner. 
According to them, focus groups can be used to explore “relational” aspects of the way that a 
local people feel about risks. In this way, the connections between how people experience, 
define, think, feel and represent risks in relation to wider debates about the community in 
which the participants live can be identified (Waterton & Wynne, 1999: 129). Hence, 
according to Susan E. Short, some researchers call it “focus group discussion” instead of 
“focus group interviews”, because the interaction among participants in groups is highlighted 




 Firstly, it is better to make clear the difference between interviews and the survey 
questionnaire (which has been largely used in the field) to understand functions of the former 
method. According to Morgan, although both of them are techniques for gathering 
information from people, there are considerable differences. In surveys, a fixed set of 
questions are used with exactly the same set of predetermined response options. On the 
contrary, interviews have more flexibility in the questions themselves and also in the answers. 
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Moreover, when it comes to analysis, a survey focuses on numerical summaries, while 
interviews involve a more subjective process of making sense of what was said in the groups 
(Morgan, 1998a: 30). The most notable difference here is that interviews rely on the strengths 
of qualitative methods, but a survey searches for the quantitative aspects (Morgan, 1998a: 31). 
Thus, interviews are more useful for qualitative data which are not often seen as statistical 
representativeness.  
 Kitzinger and Barbour discuss that there are several reasons why interviews are 
appropriate to use in the field; 1) focus group work explores how accounts are articulated, 
censured, opposed and changed through social interaction; 2) it is better for exploring how 
points of view are constructed and expressed; 3) it is also invaluable for examining how 
knowledge, ideas, story-telling, self-presentation and linguistic exchanges operate within a 
given cultural context (Kitzeinger & Barbour, 1999: 5). According to these reasons, interview 
techniques have been often used for marketing research and incorporated into social sciences. 
Particularly, focus groups can be one of the most instrumental ways to examine the norms and 
processes that operate in public discourse through group discussions as a microcosm of the 
reality of everyday conversations (Morgan & Fellows, 345). 
 
4.2. Interview Discourse 
 
 Next, we move our interests to the textualizing process. Charles L. Briggs discussed 
an aspect of how to create discourse by recontextualizing the data in interviewing. Firstly, he 
points out functions of „bias‟ and “distortion” which underlie interview-based research. 
Interviews are saturated with these effects. Researchers “imagine the social worlds depicted in 
the content of responses, creating images of political participation, family life, work 
experience” (Briggs, 2003: 246). On the other hand, respondents also “shape their responses 
in keeping with imaginings of future texts and audiences” (Briggs, 2003: 246). Therefore, he 
stated that “constructing the interview itself as the locus of knowledge production places 
audiences and analysts alike in the grip of a powerful illusion” (Briggs, 2003: 251). This 
„illusion‟ could be some broader scholarly corporations or political agendas which control the 
process of decontextualization and recontextualization of discourse. The texts which are 
created through the use of interview data are often imagined, manipulated or politicized. 
Furthermore, interviews play “key roles in the political technologies of the modern era, being 
central to the power of the state to enumerate and imagine its citizens” (Briggs, 2003: 252). 
 In this point, we can see the process to create interview discourse from one social 
setting to others. Holstein and Gubrieum describe it as „the meaning-making process‟ which 
means that the analytic objective is not merely to describe the situated production of talk or 
summaries of what interview participants have said, but to show the reader how it is being 
said (Holstein & Gubrieum, 1999: 118). During this recontextualizing process of the data, 
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researchers create interview discourse.  
 This argument is similar to Edward Said‟s Orientalism theory, especially his 
re-presentation conception.
74
 Orientalism can be simply explained as what the Orientalist –
who write or research the Orient– do (Said, 1978: 2). While Said focused on the academic 
Orientalism after the late eighteen century, he tried to explain how Orientalism has politically, 
ideologically and culturally produced and even been producing discourses. For example, after 
September 11, the negative image of Islam and Arabs has spread in the West. Muslims are 
considered as terrorist, extremists and violence lovers etc. These stereotype images are 
strongly created by television, films, and media resources during the propaganda period of the 
anti-terrorism war (Said, 2002: 14-15). This is a clear example of how Orientalism as a 
political doctrine works.  
  











Now we see more detail for the textualizing process of Orientalism. Said focuses on 
the role of the Orientalist. This group of intellectual has a position for the interpreter of the 
Orient. As the figure 12 shows, when the Orientalist (observer) encounters new information or 
culture in the field, their eyes catch only mysteriousness or strange aspects. Therefore the 
response on the whole will be conservative and defensive. Said explained that it is perfectly 
natural for the human mind to resist the untreated strangeness (Said, 1978: 67). With this 
natural response, Orientalist starts to judge it by his own bias and create stereotype image. 
During the process, Orientalist picks up what they want to tell from the various Oriental 
realities. Thus, it can be said that receiving information not as they are but as they ought to be; 
therefore, raw reality is changed from free-floating objects into units of knowledge (Said, 
                                                   
74 Said, E. W. (1978) Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books. 
- 55 - 
 
1978: 67). As a result of the process, the Orient is not the same Orient anymore. It is 
orientalized by the Orientalist. In other words, the Orient is not merely represented as “natural” 
depictions of the Orient, but it is “re-presented” (Said, 1978: 21). 
 This function of re-presentation also works in interview research. Because 
researchers have already imagined the responds by their bias or purpose, the voice from 
responders is distorted by these effects. At this point, interview discourse is created. During 





 For conducting my fieldwork, I chose three destinations. The first one was Las 
Palmas of the Gran Canary Islands in Spain. It is located right in front of Laayoune, the 
capital of Western Sahara. There are three main reasons for choosing Las Palmas. Firstly, here, 
we can encounter various people who are related to the Western Sahara problem; 1) Sahrawi 
from Moroccan controlled region (Western Sahara and the southern part of Morocco), 2) 
Sahrawi from Tindouf, and 3) Moroccans. Secondly, people can discuss on the issue freely. 
They do not have to feel pressure from their authority, particularly, Moroccan police or 
security force. And thirdly, most of the people have lived outside of the conflict regions; 
therefore, I presume that they have more objective views toward the issue. Hence, Las Palmas 
was considered as a “meeting point” for this research. 
 The next destination was Laayoune in Western Sahara. It is the capital of Western 
Sahara and has 95 per cent of the whole population of the province, 241,045 in 2010.
75
 
According to a Spanish Census in 1974, it was only 29,010 (Hodges, 1983: 131). This large 
growth shows the fact that Moroccan immigration increased after 1975. Even though we can 
see the United Nations presence, Laayoune is economically and administratively controlled 
by Moroccan authority. For example, the photos below describe how Sahrawi residence areas 
in the center of Laayoune were treated by the government. In 2007, it was said there were 
almost 5,000 Sahrawi living under “slum” conditions (as image 2 shows) in the city (Heya, 
2011: 19). However, the area was completely broken down in 2009 (image 3). According to 
local people, the residents were given some land and money to build new houses by the 
government and had to move away. Now in 2013, although most of the areas still remains as 
empty space, some villas and schools have been built (image 4). Laayoune is understood as 
the most “heated” place of the conflict, because of the direct daily contact between Moroccan 
authority and Sahrawi. Also most of the clashes between them happened in Laayoune area. 
                                                   
75 Royaume du Maroc Ministére de la Santé (3/5/2013):  
http://www.sante.gov.ma/Departements/DPRF/OffreSoinsJuin07/FichiesPDF/DonneesDetaill
ees/RepertoireOffreSoins/02-4-ProvLaayoune.pdf  
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The Gdim Izik Camp problem (one of the largest clashes after 1975) in 2010 is still fresh in 
their memory. Above all, I decided to visit Laayoune because of the complex character of the 
city. 
 
    Image 2. In 2007                    Image 3. In 2009                
        
 Image 4. In 2013 
 
 My Final destination was one of the historical cities in Morocco, Marrakech. 
Marrakech Province is the fourth biggest populated area in Morocco and it has 1,063, 415 
inhabitants in 2004.
76
  It is located almost in the middle of Moroccan territory and is also 
known as a gate city for traveling to Atlas and Sahara. Because of this geographical reason 
and size of the city, I could encounter various intellectuals who have high education, work 
with administration sector or have knowledge about the issue.  
 In addition to all, I was also planning to visit Tindouf refugee camp (which is located 
at southwestern Algeria) to obtain broader information from the Polisario side. However, due 
to the security concern, particularly just after the incident of the Tiguentourine gas plant 
                                                   
76 Royaume du Maroc  Haut-Commissariat Plan (7/5/2014):  
http://www.hcp.ma/Recensement-general-de-la-population-et-de-l-habitat-2004_a633.html  
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attack in January, 2013,
77
 I had to cancel the trip. 
 
4.3.2. Recruiting: Formal or Socio-emotional Styles 
 
 As we have already discussed above, the recruiting will one of the most important 
factors to produce the interview data. Here I explain how I recruited participants with the 
reference of formal and socio-emotional styles.  
 Wil Dijkstra, Lieneke Van Der Veen and Johannes Zouwen mention two styles of 
interviewing setting; one is formal interview and the other is socio-emotional style of 
interview (Dijkstra, Veen and Zouwen, 1985: 54). According to them, socio-emotional style of 
interviewing is based on everyday social conversation which is often established by personal 
relationship (Dijkstra, Veen and Zouwen, 1985: 38). Compared to formal interview, 
socio-emotional style of interviewing can give respondents more opportunity to talk about 
sensitive issues. Alan Bryman also points out the conversation analysis based on the talk in 
naturally occurring situations. Talk is not “mere” representation of the social world, but also 
here-and-now context of immediately preceding talk (Bryman, 2001: 523).  
 Since my research topic has very sensitive aspects of on-going political issue, I used 
socio-emotional style of interviewing in sensitive situation, particularly when I discuss with 
strangers. On the other hand, I set formal interviews with the respondents whom I have 
known since my first fieldwork in 2007 or their acquaintances. I made five interviews based 
on every day conversation and eight formal interviews.  
 
4.3.3. Composition of the Focus Groups 
 
 Now I explain the composition of the groups. How many participants will compose a 
group? Who will be participants? Do they already know each other before or not?  
 Although an orthodoxy emerging from the market research literature stipulates that 
the ideal number of participants is between eight and twelve, this number is considered too 
large for many sociological studies (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 8). Morgan suggests six or 
even fewer participants for a group when the participants have strong feelings about the topic 
or the topic is complex (Morgan, 1998b: 73). Smaller groups have the advantage of giving the 
participants an increased opportunity to express themselves and produce reactions to what 
others say, even though the responsibility on each participant increases compared to larger 
                                                   
77 A total of 37 foreign hostages from eight different countries, along with 11 Algerian 
workers, were killed by the Al-qaeda linked group on a gas facility in southern Algeria in 
middle of January in 2013. According to Al-Jazeera, the purpose of the attack was retaliation 
against Christians who kill their brothers in Mali and Afghanistan and plunder their 
resources. Al-Jazeera Internet New from 22nd of January, 2013 (7/5/2013): 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/20131215502836355.html  
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groups. According to my research purpose, I focused on local people (both Sahrawi and 
Moroccan) who were deeply involved with the topic and also emotionally caught up in the 
issue. I expected that the participants needed a lot of time to express their feelings and ideas, 
and at the same time, the moderator must control to not heat up the discussion. Therefore, I 
decided to compose smaller group with two to three participants in each group. 
 Also deciding on the right number of groups is a matter of research question. If the 
responses are more diverse, we must approach to larger number of groups to hear different 
thoughts. Morgan said reaching a point of “theoretical saturation” is a basic concept in 
qualitative research. According to him, theoretical saturation is “a process of adding cases 
until you have uncovered the full range of what there is to observe. The actual number of 
cases is less important than the sense of having fully covered of saturated the topic of study. 
Saturation is achieved when new cases no longer yield new information” (Morgan, 1998b: 78). 
I used this guiding principle in my study. I started to figure out some points of theoretical 
saturation after conducting several interviews, even though there were many different points 
of view among the same category of the groups. I have conducted five focus groups and eight 
individual interviews.  
 Focus groups require comfort with interactionist perspectives. It basically depends on 
the group design. Particularly when the topic has sensitive aspects, it is important to select 
homogenous participants, because the sensitivity of responses to the context of focus groups 
might raise concern about response validity (Short, 2006: 108). Thus, Barbour and Kitzinger 
discuss that bringing together participants on the basis of some shared experience and 
stressful life event is productive (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999: 8). The most common 
demographic characteristics for determining group composition are gender, ethnicity, age, 
education level, occupation, income and family composition (Morgan, 1998b: 60). According 
to these characteristics, in the Western Sahara case, the researcher should design focus groups 
with the same ethnic identity who also have a common background; therefore, I designed the 
groups as below: 
 
1) Sahrawi who have lived in Western Sahara since Spanish colonial time: Composed 
 by family background 
2) Sahrawi who is living in Las Palmas: Composed by both family and friends 
3) Sahrawi and Moroccan who are living in Las Palmas: Composed by friends 
4) Moroccan who live in Marrakech, in Morocco: Composed by friends 
 
 Furthermore, the participants feared pressure by the police or opponent forces in 
on-going social contact after the research. It is also important to create a safe atmosphere for 
the disclosure of sensitive or thoughts. Clare Farquhar discusses that working with 
pre-existing groups would maximize participant safety (Farquhar, 1999: 53). If we consider 
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the topic and social conditions, using pre-existing groups would protect their privacy within 
the communities. Although the purpose of representing diversity within the community would 
be challenged, I decided for safety reason to compose groups with members who had already 
known each other. 
 
4.3.4. The Role of Moderator 
 
 The role of moderator (including translator) is a key point in managing the discussion 
and reaching useful data. Kitzinger and Barbour suggest that the moderator must have 1) prior 
knowledge of the language, gestures, discourse and cultural meanings of the participants; 2) 
preparation for sensitive moments; 3) skill to create more dynamic situation of a focus group 
discussion (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 13). According to these suggestions, the moderator 
must have not only sufficient knowledge of the issue itself, but also of the socio-cultural 
background of the participants. For example, what word should I choose to describe the 
territory of Western Sahara? Is it an „occupied area by Morocco‟ or „part of Moroccan 
territory‟? The choise should depend on whom I discussed with. The reaction of the 
participants sometimes made it necessary to change the word. 
 There is also another example of the importance of the language skill. Even though 
the difference between the word „Western Sahara‟ and „Moroccan Sahara‟ is very clear in 
English, it is not quite so in Arabic. Western Sahara is called „ية غرب صحراء ال  A-SSaHara) ال
al-gharbiya)‟ in Arabic. On the other hand, Moroccan Sahara is translated „ية غرب م صحراء ال  ال
(A-SSaHara al-magharibiya)‟. The difference is only “م (ma)”; however, غرب  (al-gharb) ال
means “the West” and Morocco in Arabic is غرب م  .”al-magharib) which also means “sunset) ال
Thus, this small difference can create a huge misunderstanding of one‟s idea of the Western 
Sahara problem. Thus, the moderator must have deep knowledge of both the issue and its 
background, particularly the high language skill and flexibility toward reactions of 
participants.  
 
4.3.5. Topic and Materials 
 
 The main goal for this research was figuring out the political opinion and national 
identity of the local people. For obtaining this goal, I set two main topics here. The first one 
was simply asking the respondents to describe the Western Sahara issue; both the current 
situation and its future status. The key topics of the conversation were a cancellation of the 
ferry boat from Las Palmas to Tarfaya and the Gdim Izik Camp incident. Naviera Armas 
launched a new ferry service from Las Palmas to Laayoune on 20
th
 of June in 2010.
78
 
                                                   
78 Ferry Line.com (4/5/2013):  
http://www.ferrylines.com/en/archive/archive-list/details/artikel/naviera-armas-expands-servi
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However, after the Gdim Izik Attack, the route has been closed. Because these two events had 
an impact on the local people and their daily life, it made it easier to get attention from 
respondents as a warming up topic.  
 Secondly, there is one photo which describes “Allah, al-waTan and al-malik (The 
God, the nation and the King)”, which was taken by the researcer in Layounne. These words 
can be seen in most of the cities in the Moroccan controlled region. “The God” and “the King” 
are easy to understand, but what is “al-waTan”? I presumed this word gave different meanings 
to each person. Did it indicate “Moroccan nation” or “Sahrawi nation”? Or could it be 
“Arabic nation” or “Berber nation”? I focused on what idea the respondents had about the 
word “al-waTan”. 
 




4.4. Chapter Summary: For the Successful Fieldwork 
 
 After discussing the methodological aspects of my research, I now conclude with the 
analysis on advantages and disadvantages of the interviewing method. As I have already 
discussed, interview data can be seen as vox populi. However, the data are produced by 
exactly that situation with those participants who have their own individual historical 
background. Therefore, the data cannot be used as a synecdochic source, but as a case-by-case 
data. We should recognize this point as a limitation for the interview method.  
 On the other hand, the voice from respondents can be a clue to understand the issue. 
                                                                                                                                                               
ces-again-new-ferry-canary-isl-laayounewestern-sahara/  
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Even though the ordinary “self” is not totally free from the putative agent, the researcher can 
encounter respondents‟ feelings behind the words through direct eye-to-eye contact among the 
participants. In this process, how to judge the information from respondents will have an 
influence over the result. Shintaro Yoshimura points out three basic points of being a 
fieldworker; to have 1) high school level of local language skill, 2) sufficient knowledge of 
social background, and 3) a direct sensitivity “cold passion” (Yoshimura, 2009: 18-19). With 
these three skills, the researchers are able to obtain the data, and to judge with objective view 
against bias. Above all, before going to the field, the researcher must have enough knowledge 




“The barking of a dog does not disturb the man on a camel” an Arabic proverb  
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Chapter 5. Data and Analysis: Dilemma between Moroccan Citizenship and Sahrawi 
National Identity 
 
 This is the chapter analyzes the data gathered during fieldwork. First, I discuss the 
role of citizenship in a multinational state. As we have already seen in chapter 3, nation does 
not always correspond with state, rather most states are composed of multi-nations. It could 
be an autonomous condition within a state. T. K. Oommen stated that: 
 
[T]he idea of citizenship as an instrument of equality poses far fewer problems in 
homogeneous states in which it is fused with nationality. We need the concept of 
citizenship precisely because it is different from nationality and ethnicity. Citizenship 
provides the non-national ethnic and minority populations in a multi-national state with 
a sense of belonging and security (Oommen, 1997: 28). 
 
According to this statement, citizenship is based on a common civil right within a state or a 
multi-national state. For example, some Sahrawi who have Moroccan citizenship may claim 
Sahrawi national identity, instead of Moroccan one. Now, I will describe the relationship 
between citizenship and national identity (nationality) in the case of Sahrawi. 
 The passport plays a significant role in this context. In general understanding, people 
could not travel without a passport which is a certification of one‟s nationality. However, 
people in Western Sahara have lived in the non-self-governmental territory. What kind of 
passport do they obtain when they need to go abroad? What is their nationality? I will try to 
answer those questions with the case of Aminatou Haidar. Next, due to the uncertain situation 
and lack of clear future of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi people start to seek “better life” on 
their own. In this process, some people enjoy citizen right as Moroccans while they refuse 
Moroccan illegal occupation and claim for total independence of Western Sahara. The 
situation was well described by the Moroccan King. He said “there is no room for ambiguity 
or deceit /…/ [o]ne is either a patriot, or a traitor.”
79
 I focus on the meaning of “to be a patriot 
or a traitor” with referring the Sahrawi‟s opinion which I encountered in my field work. 
 Also, related to these questions, I point out a dilemma in the Sahrawi nation unity. 
Thirty-eight years of Sahrawi‟s diaspora might provide different ideas of the future status of 
Western Sahara to the population in Laayoune and Tindouf. At this point, although they have 
kept a common national identity as Sahrawi, they might not share a common national goal. I 
try to discover the different political goals within Sahrawi national unity here. Finally, I 
conclude this chapter with the discussion of what the nation (al-Watani) means for Sahrawis. 
To avoid further conflict, achieving independence, and maintain unity of Sahrawi, what will 
individual Sahrawi find be gained through a solution of the conflict? I will discuss the 
dilemma within the context of Sahrawi national unity. 
                                                   
79 Speech by HM the King on the occasion of the Green March, 9th of November in 2009 
(9/5/2013): http://www.corcas.com/  
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5.1. Passport and National Identity 
 
 The passport is “the key to crossing international space because it connects the 
individual to a sovereign state and the citizen to a nation” (Salter, 2003: 143). The function of 
the passport is not only as a travel document at the border control, but also as “a determinant 
of nationality” (Salter, 2003: 158). Except refugee passport, if the person has Japanese 
passport, it is automatically understood that he or she has Japanese nationality. This is a 
general understanding of the function of the passport and nationality.  
 However, there are some cases which this function does not work in. For instance, 
the territory of Western Sahara internationally classifies as a “non-self-governing territory” 
and Moroccan sovereignty over the territory is not recognized by any states. Nevertheless, as 
it is known widely, Morocco administers the Western Sahara territory as if it were part of 
Morocco. Therefore, as a matter of course, Moroccan authority issues passports for the 
population who live in the territory. The problem here is the authority, which does not have its 
sovereignty of the territory recognized by the international society, has issued the document – 
a passport - which has international functions for its population. Hence, the situation produces 
contradiction.  
 In this section, we will discuss what kinds of national identity the population has, 
while referring my data from the fieldwork and the case of Aminatou Haidar.  
 
5.1.1. Where are you from? 
 
 During field research, we usually introduce ourselves when we encounter the 
informants. One of the basic questions is “where are you from?” Although this question is 
widely used for general daily conversation, it has a special meaning behind it, because the 
answer for the question is linked to national identity –which country the person feels to 
belong to. I have collected five cases about this question. The conversations were kept in 
Darija (Moroccan Arabic).  
 Before going to the detail, I would like to explain how I recognize them as Sahrawi. 
In most of the cases, their traditional clothes, Melhfa and Dara, identify themselves as 
Sahrawi. For example, I could recognize the boy in the first case below as a Sahrawi because 
he was with his mother who wore Melhfa.  
  
1) A nine years Sahrawi boy who lives in Las Palmas, and is originally from Laayoune 
 The interviewer: “Where are you from?” 
 The respondent: “I am from Morocco.” 
 The interviewer: “Which city in Morocco are you from?” 
 The respondent: “I am from Laayoune.” 
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2) A Sahrawi woman who lives in Las Palmas with Spanish nationality, and is originally 
from Sidi Ifni 
 The interviewer: “Where are you from?” 
 The respondent: “I am from Morocco.” 
 The interviewer: “Which city in Morocco are you from?” 
 The respondent: “I am from Sidi Ifini.” 
 
3) A Sahrawi taxi driver who studies in Rabat, and is originally from Laayoune 
 The interviewer: “Where are you from? 
 The respondent: “I am ORIGINALLY from Laayoune, I am a Sahrawi.” (He 
 emphasized the word “originally”). 
 
4) A Sahrawi man who lives in Laayoune 
 The interviewer: “Could you give me your address?” 
 The respondent: He wrote the name of the country “Sahara”. Then he smiled and 
 crossed the word. After that, he re-wrote “Morocco”. 
 
5) A Sahrawi woman who lives in Las Palmas with her family, is originally from Laayoune 
 The interviewer: “Where are you from?” 
 The respondent: “I am from Sahara. I am a Sahrawi.” 
 After a short time, she wanted to introduce her Moroccan friend to a Norwegian 
 woman. She said, “He comes from OUR country.” 
 
 About the first case, the boy has Moroccan national identity even though he is from 
Laayoune in Western Sahara. He seems to have the view that Laayoune is a part of Morocco. 
In the second case, the respondent also does not have any doubt about her nationality. She 
identifies herself as a Moroccan. In the third and the forth cases, it is clear that they do not 
want to classify themselves as Moroccans, rather they show their identity belong to Sahrawi. 
The last case is more interesting. Even though she has a particular identity as a Sahrawi, she 
seems to express a kind of “brotherhood” feeling towards the Moroccans. The word, “our,” 
which she used, shows that there are some sorts of common identity between Moroccan and 
Sahrawi. This case shows one‟s national identity could be shifted depending on the situation 
or whom you talk with. 
 We can say here that each Sahrawi has his/her own identity and an idea of national 
belonging. Moreover, as in the last case, the categorization of national identity might change 
because it has a multi-dimensional character. National identity can be combined with class, 
religion and ethnic categories; therefore, when the woman used the word “our”, she might be 
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categorized herself with religious aspect, instead of political one. Taking this 
multi-dimensional character of national identity into consideration, now I go more into detail 
of the case of Aminatou Haidar which shows the complicated condition for Sahrawi‟s national 
identity in Western Sahara. 
 
5.1.2. The Case of Aminatou Haidar  
 
 In connection with passports and national identity, the case of Aminatou Haidar is 
illustrative. It created international attention towards the Western Sahara issue. Aminatou 
Haidar, who has been nicknamed “Gandhi of Sahara”,
80
 is a Human Rights activist in 
Western Sahara. She conducted a-34-days hunger strike (from the 15
th
 of November to the 
17
th
 of the December in 2009) at the Spanish airport of Lanzarote in Canary Islands. Why did 
she sacrifice her comfort for such a long time? What was her message? 
 Haidar was born in 1967 in Akka in Tata province (the former Spanish Protectorate 
zone of Morocco), and moved to Laayoune in 1976 after her father‟s death.
81
 According to an 
anthropologist, Vivian Solana, Haidar‟s father had been assassinated by the Moroccan 
security forces (Solana, 2011: 59). Haidar herself had been jailed for three years and seven 
months with more than 400 Sahrawis on the eve of the arrival of a United Nations delegation 
to Laayoune in 1987 (Haidar, 2007: 347). Furthermore, she was tortured in public and 
arrested again on 17 of June in 2005 with a group of nine Sahrawi human rights defenders and 
dozens of conscientious objectors, after a peaceful Intifada of the Sahrawis which occurred in 
the previous month (Haidar, 2007: 348). She was sentenced to seven months imprisonment. 
Haidar is the President of the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA) and 
known as one of the main promoters of the Sahrawi civil resistance movement. Because of 
her activities, she was awarded the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award in 2008 and the 
Civil Courage Award by the John Trian Foundation in 2009.  
 Since Haidar has obtained a Moroccan passport in 2004, she has been abroad several 
times. When she comes back from abroad, she usually has written “Sahrawi” on the 
nationality box of the landing card at the Moroccan airport, instead of “Moroccan” (Solana, 
2011: 59). However, on her way back from the United States, where she received the human 
rights award, she was intercepted by Moroccan security officials at Laayoune airport. Because 
she declined to stop advocating for self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, she 
was asked to sign a police statement to renounce Moroccan citizenship, and her passport and 
identification documents were confiscated. Then, the security officials decided to put her on a 
flight to Lanzarote in the Canary Islands and expelled her from Western Sahara without a 
                                                   
80 BBC News, 2
nd
 of December, 2009 (19/05/2013):  http://news.bbc.co.uk/  
81
 El PAÍS, 13
th
 of December, 2009 (19/05/2013):  http://elpais.com/  




 At the same time, the pilot was told by a Moroccan Commander that “[t]he 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is informed and has approved the decision (Solana, 2011: 
60)”. As a matter of fact, the Spanish authorities allowed her to enter the country, but they did 
not accept her to exit from there without a passport, even though Haidar desired to go back 
home. This is the cause why she decided to go on a hunger strike.  
 According to Agence Maghreb Arabe Press (MAP), Haidar “refused, upon her arrival 
at the airport, to provide information on her identity, residence and nationality, as required in 
the international regulations”.
83
 Furthermore, Moroccan Foreign Minister, Taieb Fassi-Fihri 
said that Haidar “has to bear the consequences of her actions; she has renounced and willingly 
signed away her Moroccan citizenship/…/ (she) has benefited from her national passport for 
years, has willingly decided to return her Moroccan passport and national identity card”.
84
 In 
fact, Haidar holds Moroccan citizenship and a Moroccan passport. Seeing from a Moroccan 
situation, providing a passport to its citizen means that Moroccan government as a sovereign 
state gives the citizen to link directly to the sovereign‟s internationally legal identity and 
protect her as a Moroccan citizen; therefore, there is no question for its nationality. The citizen 
who has a Moroccan passport holds a Moroccan nationality. As Mark B. Salter discuss, “[t]he 
question of nationality was brought into sharp focus by the passport, which is the 
documentary trace of governmental control over its population (Salter, 2003: 152)”. Thus, the 
government concluded to confiscate Haidar‟s passport because of her denial of Moroccan 
nationality and citizenship. For the Moroccan government, Haidar is a “separatist” who brings 
a risk for the “territorial integrity” of the Moroccan nation. 
 On the other hand, Haidar‟s hunger strike reminds of the responsibility as a former 
colonial authority of Western Sahara to the Spanish government. Haidar told to Spanish 
newspaper El País, “[i]n 1975 Spain made a mistake because it did not anticipate the 
determination of the Sahrawi People. In 2009 they have made a mistake again because they 
don‟t know Aminetu Haidar” (Solana, 2011: 57). What kind of mistake did Spain make again? 
Firstly, Spanish authority made a contradiction on the arrival of Haidar. Although they 
admitted her into the territory against her will and carried no passport, Haidar was not allowed 
to go back to her home because she did not have a passport. According to the Article 13 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights, “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country”.
85
 If Spanish government would follow the 
declaration, they should send Haidar back home. The second, because of the impasse of the 
situation (at the moment, the Moroccan authority claims that only if Haidar apologizes, they 
                                                   
82 Amnesty International, 17th of November, 2009 (20/05/2013): http://www.amnesty.org/en/  
83 MAP, 13th of November, 2009 (15/05/2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com/  
84 Maghrebia, 8th of December, 2009 (19/05/2013): http://maghrebia.com/en_GB/ 
85 The United Nation Webpage: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (6/6/2013): 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/  
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will provide her with a new passport),
86
 the Spanish authority decided to offer Spanish 
nationality to her. However, Haidar refused this offer and demanded her original passport 
back.
87
 Providing a new nationality and a citizenship –making an exception against the 
international legal system– do not solve the problem. What Haidar desires is not a new 
nationality, she wants to show the world what kinds of contradiction and illegal situation have 
existed for more than 30 years in a supposedly democratic country, and how people are blind 
of the fact. She rather claims the justice to exercise Sahrawi‟s right of self-determination as 
the United Nations promised.  
 After a month of hunger strike, finally Haidar was allowed to leave Spain without a 
passport and went back to her home in Laayoune. Due to the international pressure on 
Morocco, especially from the United State and France which unofficially support Moroccan 
occupation, the Moroccan authority had to compromise their strategy (Zunes, 2008: 1).  
 Above all, we can say that the contradictory situation in Western Sahara produces a 
confusion of national identity. As we see in Haidar‟s case, she demands her Moroccan 
passport because Morocco is the “actual” administrative power over the Western Sahara 
territory, even though it is not recognized as an international legal subject. On the other hand, 
Sahrawi people are still waiting to exercise their right of self-determination which is promised 
by the United Nations. In fact, if Sahrawi people who live in Western Sahara want to go 
abroad, the only option is to obtain the Moroccan passport as its national identification.
88
 At 
this point, the contradiction occurs. Next we will see how this confusing situation influences 
the people‟s identities.  
 
5.2. “Play with Two Strings” 
 
 Moroccan King Mohammed VI said in his address to the nation at the 34
th
 
anniversary of the Green March that “there is no room for ambiguity or deceit: either a person 
is Moroccan or not /…/ [o]ne is either a patriot, or a traitor. There is no halfway house. One 
cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, only to abuse them and conspire with the 
enemies of the homeland.”
89
 This speech of the King is considered to be a trigger for the 
Aminatou Haidar‟s case. The message is very clear that either you are a Moroccan who 
supports the national unity or not. During the fieldwork, one of my informants told me that 
                                                   
86 .BBC News; Morocco demands apology from hunger strike activist (7/5/2013): 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/  
87 BBC News, (19/05/2013): http://news.bbc.co.uk/  
88 The National Center of Documents Production of SADR in Tindouf has been produced 
Sahrawi passport, which is available for diplomats, students and patients who need to be 
treated in a country that recognizes the SADR. Sahara Press Service, 8th of September in 
2012 (8/5/2013) http://allafrica.com/  
89 Speech by HM the King on the occasion of the Green March, 9th of November in 2009 
(9/5/2013): http://www.corcas.com/  
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“Some Sahrawi, especially from the north (Tarfaya region), play with two strings”. According 
to him, the saying “play with two strings” means that these Sahrawis could be “Moroccans” 
or “Sahrawis” depending on the situation. Likewise according to the King‟s speech, one 
cannot enjoy the rights of citizenship while at the same time supporting the independence of 
Western Sahara. In short, one is playing both Moroccan citizenship and Sahrawi national 
identity. Here we will analyze the example of the above situation which I encountered in the 
field.  
 
5.2.1. Melhfa as a Tool 
 
 Melhfa is a traditional cloth for Sahrawi woman. It is four meters long by one meter 
wide piece of texture which has often beautiful colorful pattern or sometimes simply designed 
with one color. Because of those special characters, it is very easy to recognize (image 6). It 
also has a role in identifying women as belonging to the Sahrawi ethnic group (Rguibi & 
Belehsen, 2006: 619). On the contrary, Moroccan women traditionally wear the cloth which is 
called “Jilbabun”. This gives visual difference between Sahrawi and Moroccan women and it 
is easy to identify each other which the ethnic group she belongs to.  
 
Image 6. Melhfa and Dara 
 
  
According to my interview, this melhfa can be a tool in some situations. This is a 
conversation from one focus group interview in Las Palmas. These two women are Sahrawis 
from Sidi Ifni who wear melhfa and hold Moroccan passports. 
 
The respondent 1: “People in Las Palmas are very kind to Sahrawi. If I wear Melhfa to go 
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  to the hospital, they will give me priority. I even do not have to wait for a 
  long line.”  
The respondent 2: “Especially after 2010 (Gdeim Izik incident), Spanish people here feel 
  sympathy to Sahrawi. If they see a woman with Melhfa, they are kind to 
  us.” 
 
Because Melhfa visually gives their identification, people will judge the person as they look 
like. Related to this topic, on the contrary, here is another example how people judge 
Moroccans in Las Palmas. This is one conversation between one Chinese man who was living 
in the Canary Islands and one Moroccan man. 
 
Chinese man: “Where are you from?” 
Moroccan man: “I am from Morocco.” 
Chinese man: “Do you have Sahara?” 
Moroccan man: “Yes, we have Sahara.” 
Chinese man: “You are a politician.” 
 
According to this conversation, it seems like the Chinese man has some kind of stereo type 
idea about Moroccans. His meaning sounds like Moroccan people, who think Sahara is their 
territory, are all politicians who take part in an illegal occupation. Another Moroccan 
informant, who has lived in Las Palmas for more than seven years, describes the local people 
as “racist” because of their attitude toward Moroccans. It seems that ordinary life in Las 
Palmas has been already politicized for both Moroccan and Sahrawi. 
 The Canary Islands are located just outside of Western Sahara and also the place 
where Aminatou Haidar had her hunger strike. Because of this geographical location and 
Spanish responsibility on the colonial issue, local people‟s sympathies are attuned toward the 
Western Sahara problem. This situation produces some sorts of pro-Sahrawi and 
anti-Moroccan atmosphere; therefore, Melhfa and Jilbabun, which are visual items to show 
their belongings, could be a tool for some occasions. 
 
5.2.2. For a Better Life 
 
 Next we discuss one example of the some Sahrawis who move between Laayoune in 
Western Sahara and Tindouf refugee camp in Algeria. Because of mines at the border area 
between Algeria and Western Sahara, the movement to cross the border has a lot of risk. 
However, according to an informant, it is possible to pass through Mauritania, and some 
Sahrawis move from Laayoune to Tindouf, and the reverse is also possible. Why do they 
choose to exile? 
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 In 2008, the Moroccan authorities designated 20,000 plots of land for distribution to 
the Sahrawis, based on tribal and electoral calculations (Boukhars & Amar, 2011: 229). 
Related to this announcement, one of the informants points out the reason for the exile.  
 
The respondent: “The (Moroccan) government gives 700,000MAD to the Sahrawis who come
   back from Tindouf. This brings up a big confusion. Some Sahrawis (who
   live in Laayoune) exile to Tindouf for a couple of years, then they return to
   Laayoune for obtaining this offer from the Moroccan government. This is a 
  big mistake made by the government. The situation is chaos.” 
 
According to the above statement, some Sahrawis exile to Tindouf for getting the offer from 
the Moroccan government after their returning. Due to the high rate of unemployment, lack of 
housing capacity and daily necessities in Laayoune,
90
 the people there are struggling for the 
life. Thus, it is no wonder if they chose condition as “Sahrawis who defect from the Polisario” 
to achieve “better life”. 
 Mahjoub Salek, a leading member of Khat as-Shahid,
91
 left the refugee camp for 
Morocco and was viewed as an exile. He told to the Tel Quel (Moroccan news magazine) that 
“(Moroccan) King VI has shown far greater interest in the welfare of the Sahrawi people” 
(Campbell, 2010: 579). He is not the only exile from the refugee camp, but other high-level 
leaders have also defected over the years. For example, Ahmadou Soilem, who was a personal 
advisor to the Polisario Secretary General Mohammed Abdelaziz, left Tindouf in 2009 
because of disillusionment with the Polisario leadership and unbearable conditions in the 
camps.
92
 The Moroccan authority “offers safe haven and incentives –both economic and 
political– for Sahrawis who defect from the Polisario. Sahrawis who support Morocco‟s 
autonomy plan are given positions in Moroccan-based organizations, as well as in the 
Moroccan parliament itself.”
93
 Needless to say, even though there are various reasons for the 
political exile, we might not deny that their desires “to have a better life” decide their 
destinations.  
 Now I will come back to the phrase “play with two strings”. Under the 
thirty-eight-year of unsolved conflict, the people are frustrated, disappointed and tired of the 
situation. Although they have s strong will to achieve their right of self-determination, some 
                                                   
90 The unemployment rate in Laayoune province stood at 25 per cent in 2001/2002, and 27 
per cent in Smara (the local people in Smara believe it to be more like 45 per cent) (Shelly, 
2004: 90). 
91 Khat as-Shahid is a militant nationalist organization in the Sahrawi refugee camp. It 
advocated in the refugee camps for government reform and a recommitment to national 
struggle for independence. Particularly, it claims renewed armed conflict (Campbell, 2010: 
574). 
92 Organization for Statehood & Freedom (1/6/2013): 
http://www.statehoodandfreedom.org/en/the-saharawi-stuggle/polisario-defections  
93 Ibid. 
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Sahrawi utilize double national identities, as Moroccans and as Sahrawis, to obtain their own 
goals in life. The respondents in Las Palmas prefer to wear Melhfa to get attention from the 
local population, even though they identify themselves as Moroccans. Furthermore, some 
political exiles are crossing the border to obtain their personal benefit, rather for political 
reasons. It seems that one‟s personal goal is the main criterion to decide his/her destination, 
not national interest. In this case, nationalism is not always the most important. In the next 
section I will discuss how this dilemma of the national identity issue affects the ethnic identity 
as Sahrawi.  
 
5.3. Dilemma of National Identity: Battle and Peace between the Families 
 
 Since Spain terminated their colonial rule in Western Sahara in 1975, Sahrawis are 
divided in their destinies. According to Tony Hodges, less than 40-50,000 Sahrawis were 
living in Moroccan territory by 1974, and 73,497 Sahrawis in Western Sahara area were 
counted in the census of the same year (Hodges, 1983b: 35 &49). Among these numbers, 
approximately 50,000 Sahrawis took refuge in Tindouf after Morocco and Mauritania 
occupied the territory (Hodges, 1983a: 233). At the same time, the rest of the population 
remained under Moroccan (and Mauritanian) controlled zone in Western Sahara. As I mention 
before, since Morocco built the “sand wall”, it has been restricted to cross the border between 
Western Sahara and the refugee camp. Although, they are connected with internet or 
telephone line thanks to the development of technology, and in spite of the family 
re-unification program offered by the UNHCR nowadays,
94
 their life remains geographically 
and politically divided. A Sahrawi diaspora has been created. 
 The Polisario Front, which has controlled the refugee camp since 1975, is understood 
as the only movement for Sahrawi nationalism.
95
 Since it was established in Tindouf in 1976 
the SADR, it plays a role as the representative of Sahrawi and takes part in direct negotiations 
with Moroccan authorities. Nevertheless, after 38 years of the diaspora, is it still possible to 
say that the Polisario is the only representative of Sahrawi or they have kept their national 
unity? Now we will discuss the dilemma among the Sahrawis. 
 
5.3.1. Laayoune versus Tindouf? 
 
 During fieldwork, I often heard from the informants about a confrontation between 
                                                   
94 UNHCR launched an expanded program of visits for long-separated Sahrawi families in 
the Tindouf refugee camp and in the Western Sahara in 2012. So far over 12,800 people have 
visited family members. UNHCR Webpage (4/6/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/4f859e906.html  
95 According to Tony Hodges, the Polisario congress declared that “the Sahrawi people have 
no alternative but to struggle until wresting independence, their wealth and their full 
sovereignty over their land (Hodges, 1983a: 163).” 
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Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf. As we already have discussed above, the informant who 
mentioned “play with two strings”, shows a negative idea of the Sahrawis who live in the 
southern part of Morocco and agree with Moroccan authority. Here are other examples; 
 
1) A focus group composed of two Sahrawis women; a grandmother (the respondent 1) and 
her granddaughter (the respondent 2) from Sidi Ifni in Las Palmas 
 The respondent 1: “We do not have a good relationship with Sahrawis in Tindouf, 
   they do not like us.” 
 The respondent 2: “Not all, some people (from Tindouf) are polite. We talk normal. 
   But after the demonstration (related with the Gdeim Izik attack) in 
   2010 in Las Palmas, the situation changed little bit. Anyway, we 
   (young generation) are not so interested in this problem anymore. I 
   talk normal with both Moroccans and Sahrawis.” 
 
2) A focus group composed of two Sahrawis women; one is forty-seven-year-old (the 
respondent 1) and her friend around sixty-year-old (the respondent 2) from Laayoune in 
Las Palmas. 
 The respondent 1: “There is a confrontation between Sahrawis in Tindouf and 
   Laayoune. We say “hello” to each other, not more. We are basically 
   divided because of the political opinions.” 
 The interviewer: “What is the cause for the confrontation?” 
 The respondent 1: “We (from Laayoune) think all problems come from Tindouf. This 
   ferry boat between Las Palmas and Laayoune is a good example. It 
   has been stopped to operate because of the illegal travelers from 
   Tindouf. Also they (from Tindouf) think that we have a nice calm 
   life in Laayoune. And they are struggling for the difficult life in 
   Tindouf.” 
 The respondent 2: “The ferry operation was very convenient for us to go back home. 
   But after the Gdeim Izik, the company decided to stop this line. The 
   people who participate io the riot (in Laayoune in 2010) were not 
   from Laayoune. We know the local people so well, but I have not 
   seen them before. They are from Tindouf who come by the ferry 
   boat (from Las Palmas). They usually make noise for our life.” 
 The respondent 1: “Like Aminatou Haidar, they (she talked about some Sahrawi from 
   Tindouf) use the Moroccan passport for their travel. If they do not 
   agree with the Moroccan government, why do they have to use it? 
   They provide us the right and we just accept it. It is a life.” 
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As we see above, although it is difficult to determine a particular definition for the division 
between Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf, thus it can be said there are some degrees of the 
confrontation. Some Sahrawis who live in Laayoune think the people in Tindouf make 
problems and disturb their life. On the other hand, Sahawis from Tindouf see that the people 
in Laayoune have “a nice life” as having their own houses, economic activities and free of 
movements which they cannot attain in the refugee camp. In fact, as the respondent 1 in the 
second focus group said, if the person agree or at least accept to the Moroccan rule on the 
Western Sahara, or even just obtain a legal status as a Moroccan, for Sahrawis in Laayoune it 
is possible to live as “Moroccans” and enjoy officially provided equal civil rights with 
Moroccans. However, the life in the refugee camp is very harsh. Tindouf is not propitious for 
either animal husbandry or agriculture on a scale which could provide more than a small 
fraction of the refugee‟s food needs, therefore, almost all supplies have to be brought in by 
truck from a huge distance (Hodges, 1983a: 233). Thus, the SADR affirms that “private 
property is guaranteed and organized by law”, “the market economy and freedom of 
enterprise will be recognized” only “after the full achievement of national sovereignty” (Pham, 
2010: 15). The huge difference here is they do not have freedom of activities or movements. 
Although the refugee camp has highly organized health, education and administration areas 
(Lippert, 1987: 48), the only thing that they can do is to wait for the resolution in the middle 
of the great desert.  
 This gap between Laayoune and Tindouf might bring a person‟s views in different 
directions. For example, on the one hand, Aminatou Haidar is considered as “a symbol of a 
nation for Sahrawis”,
96
 but on the other hand, as the respondent 1 in the second group above 
thinks Haidar is using the right to be a Moroccan citizen. Furthermore, we might point out the 
gap between generations. As focus group 1 shows, in contradiction to the grandmother, the 
granddaughter does not judge to be a huge confrontation among them. Considering that, it is 
possible to say that there are slight gaps between the generations too. It is no wonder that the 
thirty-eight years of the diaspora produce another life history on each Sahrawi‟s hand, and 
depending on their own destiny, each person has his/her own view of the others. 
 
5.3.2. The Cease-fire in the Gdeim Izik Camp 
 
 During the interviews, the informants often mentioned the Gdeim Izik issue. It seems 
that the incident gave a huge impact on the Sahrawis who live both in Laayoune and Tindouf. 
Firstly, we shall see what happened in the Gdeim Izik Camp in 2010. 
 The Gdeim Izik Camp is located about 15 km away from Laayoune city. At the 
beginning of October 2010, the demonstrators, most of them women and unemployed young 
                                                   
96 Al-Jazeera: Western Sahara activist face curbs, 25 of December in 2009 (7/5/2013): 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/12/  
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men, gathered to protest the questionable management of development founds and social 
subsidies by the Moroccan authorities (Martín, 2012: 63). Although the Moroccan security 
forces did not ban the rally at the beginning, one accident –which brought the death of one 
Sahrawi at the check point of the camp because he was one of the passengers in the car which 
ignored the security control– dramatically changed the situation at the camp (Martín, 2012: 
63). Despite negotiations between a committee of representatives of the camp and the 
Moroccan authorities, the camp was dismantled by the security force on November 8.
97
 The 
operation took place without notice and disorder developed among those trying to run away 
from water cannons and tear gas, and those trying to organize resistance against the State 
security force. To make matters worse, the lack of information and rumors induced people to 
believe that a massacre had happened in the camp and this uncertain information brought up a 
brutal riot in the city center of Laayoune. As a result of the events, several hundred people 
(mostly Sahrawis) were injured and 11 members of the Moroccan security force and two 
Sahrawis were killed (Martín, 2012: 64). Because the events were characterized as protest 
against perceived social discrimination and political corruption, Noam Chomsky understands 
it as the “beginning of the Arab Spring”.
98
  
 Here I will just focus on the fieldwork data about how they reached to the cease-fire 
in the Gdeim Izik camp. Three informants mentioned the events. 
 
1) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan man who works for the Moroccan 
authority in Laayoune 
 The respondent: “The police man cannot go far from the city center by himself, 
   because they are under the risk of the opponent’s attack, especially 
   after the Gdeim Izik, which 11 police men were killed. Yes, the 
   salary here is 1000 MAD more than the inside (the Moroccan 
   territory), I am very tired of the pressure. I want to go back home 
   (inside Morocco) as soon as possible.”  
 
2) An individual informal interview with a Sahrawi man who works for the shop in 
Laayoune 
 The interviewer: “What was the cause for the Gdeim izik?” 
 The respondent: “It is because of social, economic problem. The main purpose was 
   to get a job, to develop social condition, not really an independent 
                                                   
97 The negotiation was reached a basic agreement on November 4. The Moroccan State 
pledged to address progressively the housing and employment demands of the protesters. Also 
the creation of a joint commission was planned; however, none of the commitments were 
fulfilled, though it should have been in force from November 8 (Martin, 2012: 64). 
98 The author attended the political talk given by Noam Chomsky at the University of 
Tromsø; “Middle East Dilemmas –Simple Solution, Difficult Obstacles” on 13th of September 
in 2012.  
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   issue at the beginning.” 
 The interviewer: “How did the Gdeim Izik camp attack come down?” 
 The respondent: “It was not because of the Moroccan police. It was we (Sahrawi) 
   talked each other. Sahrawi here, we do not like the police, we hate 
   them. But the military force is different. It is mostly composed with 
   the local Sahrawi. When the military force arrived to the camp, we 
   talked and decided to come back to the city. We understand that the 
   war does not bring any good results.” 
 
3) An individual formal interview with a Sahrawi man who works for the human rights 
organization in Laayoune 
 The interviewer: “What was the cause for the Gdeim Izik?” 
 The respondent: “There were no big plans to be like that much confusion. It was 
   normal demonstration like other part of Morocco. Even, sometimes, 
   there were some Dukhalā’ (Moroccans) to join demonstration for 
   unemployment and social issue. But some people use this situation 
   and came out big incident.” 
 The interviewer: “How did the confusion come down in the camp?” 
 The respondent: “The problem was ended because of our (Sahrawis) discussion, not 
   because of the Moroccan police. The (Sahrawi) mayor (who is
   nominated by the King) and members of the local parliament (who
   are elected by the local people) had conflict. The latter ordered to
   some Sahrawis to go to the Gdeim Izik camp. And the former is
   usually with the police which we (Sahrawi) hate. When the police
   was in the camp, the Mayor told them to come back for the security
   in the city (due to the revolt), then, the military force went to the
   camp, instead of the police. After, the things came down.” 
 
According to above information, we can say two things. At first, as all of the informants said, 
there is a deep rift between the Moroccan police and the local Sahrawis. This information falls 
in line with the discussion by Carmen Gómez Martín. She explains the total lack of 
understanding between the Moroccans and Sahrawis; “the usual political tension and the 
permanent feeling of injustice regarding the distribution of resources have been joined in the 
last year by ethnic and tribal tensions promoting dangerous racist attitudes between 
communities” (Martín, 2012: 70). Also Anouar Boukhars and Ali O. Amar mention that the 
problem of the issue is “local distrust and the government‟s lack of credibility” (Boukhars & 
Amar: 2011: 232). It can summed up with the word, Dukhalā’, in the interview. Dukhalā’ is 
plural of Dakhil, it means in Arabic “extraneous, not indigenous, alien, foreigner, stranger, 
- 76 - 
 
new comer, novice, guest” (Cowan, 1979: 316). It is used for the people who settled in the 
Western Sahara but not Sahrawis in this context. This word is often used in the conversation 
among the people in Western Sahara. It demonstrates the different identifications between 
Dukhalā’ and Sahrawis. The confrontation between them has existed not only at the political 
level but also in the daily life level. Even if the Moroccan government suggests the autonomy 
under its sovereignty, the problem would not be solved unless this confrontation is solved in 
the local community.  
 Secondly, the two informants have almost the same view of the cease-fire in Gdeim 
Izik. Even though the trigger of the event was disagreements in the local parliament, in the 
end, the Sahrawis did not want to have a war among them. They decided to calm down the 
situation and avoid further violence. Also though there are many voices to coming back to the 
armed struggle in the Tindouf refugee camp,
99
 until now, they have kept the status quo. 
Taking into account their decision as a national unity, which has been created since 1975, still 
keeps a strong tie. 
 Above all, even though the confrontation between Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf 
demonstrated, that both sides try to not bring the dispute further. It shows that they have kept 
ethnic unity. However, if the topic comes to the national identity, it might be a different 
answer. As we saw earlier in the theory chapter, a nation can be a political community which 
has a goal to create its own autonomous status, but it is not always seeking for an independent 
state. As the second focus group on page 71 shows, some Sahrawi might accept the Moroccan 
sovereignty over the Western Sahara, as long as they can enjoy the same rights like other 
Moroccans. In this case, their national identity is shifted to the Moroccan one. On the other 
hand, some Sahrawi could accept the autonomous solution under Moroccan sovereignty, and 
others claim total independence for the Sahrawi state. In both cases, their national and ethnic 
identities as Sahrawi correspond; however, there is slight difference, autonomy under 
Moroccan sovereignty and total independence. This different political idea creates a dilemma 
within Sahrawi ethnic unity.   
 
5.4. What is al-Watan (the Nation) for you? 
 
 According to Jonathan Wyrtzen, the official Moroccan national identity had 
crystallized after anti-colonial nationalist struggle as “Allah, al-Watan, and al-Malik (God, the 
Nation and the King/Sultan)”, which centered on an Arabo-Islamic unity, an official 
legitimacy as a State, and the unifying symbol of the King (Wyrtzen, 2009: 4-5). Furthermore 
he focused on the word “the nation” and said that “[c]olonization created a “nation-sized” 
political and economic unit, making the “nation” a meaningful category of identity because it 
                                                   
99
 Madeline Otis Campbell points out the rise of Khat as-Shahid, which is a militant nationalist 
organization. It has a central role of the discussions of renewed armed conflict in the refugee camp 
(Campbell, 2010: 574).  
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was directly tied to sovereignty over this unit” (Wyrtzen, 2009: 7). Morocco is a multi-ethnic 
country; it is composed of a significant number of Tamazigh population, Arab, Jewish 
community and Sahrawis in the south. In order to manage a “nation-size” group, which is 
created by colonization, the authority needed to build up a national identity among these 
various ethnic groups. They tried to tie the population together according to the same colonial 
experience; however, the strategy had not reached to cover on the Sahrawis population in 
Western Sahara when Morocco obtained independence in 1956. After the “re-unification” of 
Western Sahara in 1975, the government has been trying to integrate the Sahrawi as 
“Moroccan nation”, but as we already have discussed, it was unsuccessful.  
 Above all, what is “al-WaTan” for the Sahrawi? In Arabic, the word “Watan” means 
“homeland, home country, fatherland, home” and “Watani” has means of “home, native, 
indigenous, domestic, patriotic, national, and nationalistic” (Cowan, 1979: 1265). Now we 
shall see the difference between how Moroccans feel for the Watan and how Sahrawis do. 
 
5.4.1. The Cases of Moroccans 
 
 Nizar Messari said “[i]n Morocco, Sahrawis have consistently been seen as 
Moroccans” (Messari, 2007: 55). Likewise, Moroccan people, in general, think the Western 
Sahara is a part of their country. How do they reach to this idea? To get the answer, we will 
analyze the contexts of the Moroccan history text-book.  
 Here is a Moroccan junior high school national education and history text-book 
published by the Ministry of Education. It is used in the public school education in the country, 
including to the territory of Western Sahara. The text-book clearly shows the importance of 
national integrity and peace keeping. Firstly it tells the importance to respect the sovereignty; 
 
 سيادتها احترام هع األخري للذول الذاخلية الشؤون في التذخل بعذم يتسن الخارجية السياسة هيذان في كنا سلى ظل
(202) الذولي التعاون قىاعذ هقتضً علً هعها والتعاهل واختياراتها،  
[Translation] In the foreign policy, we should not interfere with the affairs of other countries 
with the respect of their sovereignty and choice. We should deal with them according to the rule 
of international cooperation (Translated by the author). 
 
We might understand from the first sentence that other countries should respect of Moroccan 
sovereignty and its choice of “integration” of the Western Sahara as well. Based on this rule, 
the text-book explains the necessity of peaceful coexistence in North Africa. It seems that 
Moroccan authority teaches the importance of regional cooperation, besides the Western 
Sahara issue (in fact, the Western Sahara problem does not exist in the context of text-book). 
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  Table 3. Time line of Moroccan integration 
Year The recovered area The way we recovered the territory 
1956 International Conference in Tangier International Congress in Mohmadia 
1958 Tarfaya Negotiation with Spain 
1969 Sidi Ifni Negotiation with Spain 
1975 As-Saqiyat Al-Hamra (two-third of 
Western Sahara)  
Organized “Green March” 
The Madrid Accord 
1979 Rio de Oro (rest of the Western 
Sahara) 
The Tribes in the Rio de Oro gave their faith 
to his King in Rabat 
Source: The Moroccan Ministry of Education (2005) The National Education and History 
Text-book  
 
 It describes the time table of Moroccan national integrity process (table 3). 
According to the table 3, the national unification process has begun in 1956 when Morocco 
achieved independence and, in so far, it has completed with the Western Sahara in 1979. 
Needless to say, Western Sahara is understood as a part of the Moroccan integrity in the 
context. As I already have discussed in chapter 3, the Green March in 1975 is considered as a 
turning point of national reunification process. At this point, the authority has succeeded to 
create a Moroccan national identity among various ethnic unities. Thus, every November 7
th 
(Anniversary of the Green March), the King gives a special speech (mostly about the Western 
Sahara issue) to his people and celebrates the honorable day for the nation.
100
 Likewise, the 
text-book focused on the Green March and suggested to the students “put yourself as a 
volunteer in the Green March and tell the feeling to participate to the civic movement” (203). 
As a result of the education and context of the national media source, most of Moroccan 
students believe that Western Sahara (Moroccan Sahara for them) is a part of their national 
unity. Based on this aspect, I conducted interviews with some Moroccan people who had 
studied in the junior high school. The main questions are 1) what is a solution for the Sahara 
issue? 2) What is the nation for you? Here are three examples.  
 
1) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan (Amazigh) girl who studies in the 
University of Marrakech 
                                                   
100 For the 37th anniversary of the Green March, the King said “[t]oday we are proudly 
celebrating the thirty-seventh anniversary of the glorious Green March, an epic national 
event which reflected the civilized approach chosen by Morocco to recover its Sahara. In 
addition to that, this truly historic achievement has provided an invaluable source of 
inspiration, nurturing the lofty patriotic values underpinning the symbiosis between the 
throne and the people, as well as the nation‟s unanimous, unwavering commitment to these 
sacred values” CORCAS webpage: His Majesty the King addresses a speech to the nation on 
the occasion of the 37th anniversary of the glorious Green March (9/5/2013) 
http://www.corcas.com/   
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 The interviewer: “What is a solution for the Western Sahara problem?” 
 The respondent: “We have to seek for a peaceful solution. I think autonomy (under 
   Moroccan sovereignty) is the best solution.” 
 The interviewer: “What is al-Watan for you?” 
 The respondent: “It is everything for me, like my family, my life.” 
 
2) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan (Amazigh) man who studied until high 
school education 
 The interviewer: “What is a solution for the Sahara issue?” 
 The respondent: “Sahara is our land. It is a part of the Greater Morocco. Why do 
   they need independence? 
 The interviewer: “If there is an opportunity to participate in the “Green March”, do 
   you want to join in? 
 The respondent: “Of course.” 
 The interviewer: “What is al-Watan for you?” 
 The respondent: “I do not know… it is a huge question. It is everything.” 
 
3) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan (Amazigh) man who studied two years in 
a special school after the high school education 
 The interviewer: “What is a solution for the Sahara issue?” 
 The respondent: “The autonomy (under Moroccan sovereignty) is the best for this 
   resolution. Independence is unrealistic idea. It will be war after.” 
 The interviewer: “What is al-Watan for you?” 
 The respondent: “It is from Tangier to La Gouira.” 
 
 All of the three informants consider that Western Sahara is a part of their national 
integrity (particularly the informant in the third case clearly said the range of the national 
territory); therefore, Sahrawis who live in the territory are Moroccan citizens and same as they 
are. It seems like the national education helps their idea toward the issue. Since they are born, 
the media resources, school teachers and the people around have told them “the Sahara is our 
territory” and they celebrate the “Green March” day every year. Thus, they do not have any 
questions for the status of the Moroccan government. Hence, their ideas for the nation are 
stable. It is based on the second Moroccan nationalism of 1975.  
 
5.4.2. The Cases of Sahrawis 
 
 Next we will see some examples of Sahrawis who live in Laayoune. Although both 
of the informants grow up under the Moroccan educational system, they show different view 
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of the points compared to the Moroccan informants. 
 
1) One focus group composed of one Sahrawi man (the respondent 1) and his wife (the 
respondent 2) who have education at university and his mother (the respondent 3) 
 The respondent 1: “We lost (the nation)… Some people get benefit from this conflict. 
   The situation is just chaos” 
 The respondent 2: (Nodding her head.) 
 The respondent 3: “We are tired enough of this problem. When the riot happened in 
   2010, we even could not go out from house. We have enough stress. 
   If there will be peace, we will accept the autonomy (under  
   Moroccan sovereignty). It is very hard to build a new country. It 
   might be the war between tribes if we get independent. To follow the 
   actual direction is better.” 
 
2) An individual informal interview with one Sahrawi man 
 The respondent: “We (young generation) do not feel peace for all our life. On the 
   other hand, we become no interests (in the “nation”) because the 
   Moroccan government did not change the situation, no better life. 
   We lost hope. We are divided” 
 
Comparing these examples between Moroccan and Sahrawis, the former‟s ideas are clearer 
than the latter. The Moroccan informants do not have any doubt about their national unity or 
identity. It is clear for them that they have Moroccan national identity and belong to 
Moroccan nation. Furthermore, they also consider that Sahrawi must be part of Moroccan 
national unity. On the contrary, The Sahrawi informants have confused feelings for the 
Sahrawi nation. As I discussed in section three of this chapter, they have a dilemma between 
autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and total independence of Western Sahara when it 
comes to the discussion of the future status of the territory. This is the reason why the answer 
for the “nation” is automatically connected with the political status of Sahrawi nation. On the 
one side, though the difference between Dukhalā’ and Sahrawis are highlighted in the 
occupied zone, as the informant 3 in the focus group 1 said, she will accept the autonomous 
condition under Moroccan sovereignty because she does not wish to see further conflict. 
Considering into the confrontation within the Sahrawi ethnic unity, she is afraid of another 
new conflict among themselves. On the other side, many Sahrawi believe that total 
independence as a state is the only solution for the issue (Lakhal, 2011: 50). After all, Sahrawi 
are confused when they encounter the topic at “nation”, because they understand there is no 
common idea of Sahrawi political community as national unity at the moment.  
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5.5. Chapter Summary 
 
 After thirty-eight years of Sahrawi diaspora, we must point out their dilemma within 
the national unity. Firstly, it is caused by the international legal situation in Western Sahara. 
As we see the case of Aminatou Haidar, the contradiction between “actual” power and the 
international legal status of the Sahrawi nation produces a confused national identity of the 
people. The person, who holds a Moroccan passport, must be categorized as a Moroccan 
citizen; however it does not fit for the person who claims the right of self-determination of 
his/her own identity as well as for the Sahrawi nation. On the other hand, if the person agrees 
with the rule of Moroccan authority, he/she is officially entitled to enjoy the right as a 
Moroccan citizen, which gives him/her freedom of movement. Therefore, depending on the 
choice of each person, he/she can play a role as a Moroccan citizen or a Sahrawi nationalist, 
or even someone can switch its national identity between two of them. 
 Secondly, we should not ignore the confrontation between Sahrawis in Laayoune and 
Tindouf refugee camp. Considered on the situation in which the families are divided on both 
sides, of course they are eager to maintain their family ties or even the national unity. 
Nevertheless, after thirty-eight years of diaspora, and also the hopeless situations in both 
Laayoune and Tindouf –not only the local administrative corruption in Laayoune, but also a 
growing divergence of opinion between the authority and particularly the young generation 
who insist to break up the deadlock situation by the armed struggle in Tindouf– caused a split 
in the Sahrawi national unity. Finally, even though we can see some degrees of the ethnic 
unity, for instance in the case of the cease-fire process in Gdiem Izik, Sahrawis both in 
Laayoune and Tindouf are exhausted of the chaos situation. As a result of the situation, some 
of the Sahrawi accept an autonomous condition under Moroccan sovereignty, and the others 
claim total independence of Sahrawi state. At this point, even though Sahrawi have kept the 
idea of the nation as a political community, they do not have a common way to achieve it. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion: For a Conflict Solution 
 
 In this chapter, I will summarize the discussion by coming back to the three questions 
which I suggested in the theory chapter; 1) is Sahrawi unity understood as an ethnie or 
nation?; 2) how is Sahrawi‟s national identity transformed?; and 3) is it possible to keep their 
family unit in fact despite the impact of nationalism? What kind of dilemmas do the Sahrawi 
have in regards to national unity? During the process, I consider both the theoretical 
framework in chapter 3 and fieldwork data in the chapter 5. Thereafter, taking into 
consideration the above questions, I will conclude and reflect on my research questions. As it 
is mentioned in the introduction, if the Sahrawi agree with the autonomous plan which the 
Moroccan government suggests, do they become Moroccans? Is it possible to say that one‟s 
political opinion could change one‟s “national” identity or “ethnic identity”? If the answer 
were yes, what is the cause to shift one‟s identity? It might be able to suggest a hint for the 
conflict resolution from these answers. 
 
6.1.Is Sahrawi composed as an ethnie or a nation? 
 
 As we have already discussed in chapter 3, Smith explained that the conception of 
ethnicity as a central idea between a “primordial” and a “situational” qualities. A “primordial” 
quality is understood as one of the “given” of human existence, for example, cultural 
differences like religion, custom, language (Smith, 1991: 20). In this sense, people who share 
a religion, nomadic customs and the Hassaniya language live in a wide scope in the North 
African region; most of the places in Mauritania, the northern part of Mali, southwestern 
Algeria, Western Sahara and the south of Morocco. Despite these “primordial” factors, it is 
not enough to say that they compose an ethnie, because some “situational” qualities are 
missing at this point.  
 After the colonial powers defined the border without considering local “primordial” 
qualities, the people were divided into different colonial categories. When the people met 
“strangers” (colonial powers), and, when they started anti-colonial struggle, they began to 
share common sentiments and needs. In the case of Western Sahara, the population there was 
controlled by Spanish power, instead of French one. Though the local clans were often 
fighting each other for foodstuffs and livestock, they awoke their unity when they 
encountered a new enemy, Spanish. As Smith said, “traumatic developments”, for example, 
warfare (anti-colonial struggle), have power to create ethnic boundary (Smith, 1991: 25-27). 
This is the point at which Sahrawi as an ethnic unit was formalized by both “primordial” and 
“situational” factors. 
 During the anti-colonial “nationalism” period, some of them joined in the liberation 
movement as Maghrebians, and it gave political consciousness to the Sahrawi ethnie. The 
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anti-colonial “nationalism” rose in the beginning of 1970s and it was concluded with the 
“state-building” process; the foundation of SADR in 1976. However, almost half of the 
Sahrawi had to be left under the new ruler –the Moroccan authority– and became citizens of 
its state. In fact, they have not been included in the Sahrawi nationalism movement in the 
refugee camp, at least by the spatial way. SADR have tried to create national identity as 
Sahrawi “nation-state” in Tindouf through “nation-building”. Here, the Sahrawi ethnie in the 
former Spanish region was divided into two states.  
 The important point here is the boundary of Sahrawi national identity. After 38 years 
of the division or diaspora, do Sahrawi maintain a common national identity which is based 
on their ethnic identity? This answer can be found in the empirical data which I discussed in 
the chapter 5. Two of the five Sahrawis in the interviews have Moroccan national identity, and 
the others have Sahrawi national identity. The former Sahrawis accept Moroccan rule in 
Western Sahara. One of them even positively understands that Laayoune has been 
dramatically developed through Moroccan investment. While they keep ethnic identity as 
Sahrawi, their national identity is shifted into Moroccan one. On the other hand, the latter 
Sahrawi felt frustrated with the Moroccan occupation. They share not only a common ethnic 
identity, but also a national identity as Sahrawi. Even though they are divided from SADR 
politics, their national goal is closer to the one from the Polisario. According to this data, 
depending on one‟s own experience, historical background, actual life condition will 
influence one‟s own political opinion toward the issue. Thus, it can be said that each Sahrawi 
chose national identity, either Moroccan or Sahrawi, by his/her political opinion. 
 
Figure 13. Nation Imaging Process 
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I described the transformation process from ethnie to nation for Sahrawi in figure 13. 
Due to the political pressure, sub-ethnies (clans) create an ethnie called Sahrawi. During the 
anti-colonial period, ethnie stands up for “state-building” to seek an independent state. 
However, as a result of an emerging a new ruler, the ethnie was divided into two states; 
SADR and Morocco. After 38 years of diaspora, some of Sahrawi‟s national identity has been 
sifted to Moroccan one, and the other hand, some of their national identity stay within the 
ethnic boundary. At the same time, as the interview data 5 on the page 64 shows, one person 
could have several collective identities, as a Sahrawi or a Magharebian depending on the 
situation or whom she/he talk with. It is because individual collective identities have the form 
of concentric circles (figure 8 on page 33). Thus, I conclude the figure with the A zone, which 




6.2. National Identity Transformation: Coalition or Independence? 
 
 Related to the above discussion of national identity transformation, I come back the 
examples of Assyria (explained by Smith) and Ruritanians (mentioned by Gellner) cases in 
chapter 3. Assyria was naturally assimilated to the surrounding ethnies through cultural 
syncretism, particularly with use of common language. On the other hand, Ruritanians created 
an independent state through a nationalist movement. Although many of the Ruritanians, who 
moved to the city from their homeland, assimilated into Megalomanian language, they kept a 
Ruritanians ethnic identity. Ruritanian shared three features; 1) common homeland and 
language (past): Ruritanian peasants kept their own language (including the poetry and songs) 
and traditional life in their homeland which actually existed; 2) common life condition 
(present): most Ruritanians were discriminated in the city due to the backward rustic speaking 
and the quality of life in the slum; and 3) common goal (future): Ruritanian intellectuals who 
were educated in the city stood up for the nationalist movement based on their ethnic identity. 
These are the points which Assyria does not have.  
 Taking into account the first point, most of the Sahrawi who live under the Moroccan 
role speak Darija, even though most of them speak Hassaniya in their daily life. Darija is 
largely used in the public space and the media sources including the school education. 
Furthermore, their life is established in their own homeland, they can reach the Atlantic Ocean 
or the inland traditional town Smara. On the other hand, Sahrawi in the camp have kept using 
their traditional language, Haasaniya, in both public and private life. Because the refugee 
camp is very isolated in desert region, it is rare to get influence from other ethnie. Also, the 
camp is located outside of their homeland, the Western Sahara, thus, most of their young 
generation has never been to their homeland (except the liberated area in the east), even 
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though it actually existed.  
 Regarding the second point, Sahrawi under Moroccan rule can be provided with 
Moroccan citizenship. As long as they accept the condition, they obtain to some extent 
freedom of movement and activity, including traveling abroad with Moroccan passport.
101
 
Therefore, depending on the choice of each Sahrawi, one could live as a Moroccan citizen and 
another might resist to the provided condition. However, Sahrawi in the camp do not have 
much choice in their life. Firstly, SADR does not have a formal economy, freedom of 
enterprise, or the finances to dispense salaries or wages (Farah, 2012: 33). Their life is mainly 
supported by the international humanitarian aids. Secondly, although the SADR authority 
issues its own passports, it is practically useless if they want to travel to a state which has not 
recognized the sovereignty of SADR. It means that they do not have many opportunities to go 
out from the camp, besides obtaining Algerian passport. In addition, due to the natural 
environment of the camp –it is located in the middle of the great desert– their movement has 
been limited to the camp.  
 Based on the above different situations between Laayoune and the refugee camp, 
Sahrawi‟s political opinion on the future status of Western Sahara (the goal) is demonstrated 
differently. As we have just discussed, the Sahrawi in Tindouf are mostly lead by the 
leadership of Polisario which is seeking to establish Sahrawi nation-state. Although there are 
some confrontations between the authority and particular young generation (the latter groups 
claim to be backed armed resistance), it seems their national identity is united through the 
idea of total independence of Western Sahara. Like the Ruritanian case, Sahrawi in the camp 
share 1) common homeland and language, 2) common life condition as refugees and 3) a 
common goal to achieve independence; therefore, they seek to create their own nation-state.  
 On the contrary, it seems Sahrawi under Moroccan regime are more complicated. As 
I have already discussed in the first section of this chapter, two out of the five Sahrawi whom 
I interviewed consider their national identity as Moroccans. Their life situation can be 
compared to the Assyrian case. In fact, both of them fluently speak Darija, and more 
interestingly, one of them speaks Tamazight instead of Hassniya, but she wears Melhfa. She 
seems to have two ethnic identities, Sahrawi and Tamazight. In her case, her ethnic identity –
either Sahrawi or Tamazight– transformed into Moroccan national identity as a way like other 
parts of the Tamazight population developed their ethnic identity to Moroccan national 
identity.  
 However, the other three responders have different views. Although two of them also 
speak Darija, their national identity is based on the Sahrawi ethnic identity. Why has their 
identity transformation process not taken the same road as the others? Two reasons are 
considered for this question. One is they share the idea of Sahrawi nationalism movement 
                                                   
101 However, we should not ignore the censorship of the Moroccan police, which have been 
controlling the activities of Sahrawi, particularly human right activists or journalists.  
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with the refugee camp. Even though there exists a geo-political boundary between Sahrawi in 
Laayoune and Tindouf, they share a common goal to unite Sahrawi national ties and to obtain 
total independence. The second reason is that they do not feel like they are Moroccan citizens. 
In other words, Moroccan authority could not normalize the situation in Western Sahara. As 
the responders in the page 73-74 stated, the confrontation between Moroccan police and local 
Sahrawi seems to deepen. One Moroccan informant who lives in Laayoune gave one example 
about the difference between them, “if we (Moroccan) say to Sahrawi that you should look 
right, then they will look left.” Even though they share a common life space and citizen rights, 
it seems that the ethnic difference has been further highlighted in Laayoune.  Discrimination 
toward Sahrawi also cannot be ignored. As an informant said, the demonstration in Gdeim 
Izik was not really seeking for the independent subject at the beginning, it was rather for 
socio-economic improvement; however, whenever demonstrations occur in Western Sahara, 
the Moroccan police become sensitive and they easily determine the reason of the 
demonstration as Sahrawi‟s independent movement. Hence, local Sahrawi feel high pressure 
against their activity under Moroccan rule. As a result, “Sahrawi hate the Moroccan police” 
(Page 74-75) and they increase the feeling toward their national identity. 
 Likewise collective identity has a multi-dimensional character, national identity is 
also shifted flexibly depending on both the “external” and the “internal” functions. The 
“external” function is related to the territorial, economic and political factors. The public mass 
education system, the use of national symbols, like flags, anthems and passport, give 
influence to the “internal” function. Some Sahrawi might shift their national identity into a 
Moroccan one because for economic reasons, life condition or use of common language, 
Darija. The others would feel a much deeper attachment with Sahrawi national identity 
because of the territorial dispute, political condition, their own flags and passport, etc. In short, 
national identity is determined by what functions or values the individual bases it on. 
According to this boundary, one‟s political opinion is demonstrated; either Assyrian case 
(integration) or Ruritanian case (independence). 
 
6.3. Dilemma in Sahrawi National Unity 
 
 We understand from the above argument that national identity has multi-dimensional 
character. Now we should not ignore another aspect of nationalism, which has a more harmful 
character. As I already have discussed in the theory chapter, David‟s picture “Oath of the 
Horatii” shows that the power or faith of nationalism could kill real family. Camilla was 
killed by her brother because she shed tears for her betrothed death. Related to this point, 
Anderson said “nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” (Anderson, 
1983: 141). It means nationalism is promoted by love to their nation, patria. Nationalists 
might be able to sacrifice even themselves for the patria. 
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 If I consider the situation of Sahrawi, it can be argued that the same thing is true here. 
As I mentioned before, a lot of families live separately between Laayoune and Tindouf 
refugee camp. One of my informants, who live in Laayoune, has visited his uncle and his 
family in Tindouf twice. Another informant, who is from Laayoune, has been also to the camp 
to meet her brothers. It is not only the family of Mohamed Abdelaziz, the president of SADR, 
but also many families who have members on the other side of the border.  
 However, as the empirical data show, the confrontation between Sahrawi in 
Laayoune and Tindouf cannot be ignored. One Sahrawi respondent from Laayoune said the 
people in Tindouf “think that we (Sahrawi in Laayoune) have a nice, calm life in Laayoune. 
And they are struggling for the difficult life in Tindouf” (page72). Also another Sahrawi 
respondent said about the riot in Laayoune in 2010 that the people from Tindouf “usually 
make noise for our life” (page 72). Moreover, there is an informant who imply as a possibility 
that another conflict within Sahrawi over the political power and natural resource may occur 
(page 80). Those opinions are summarized by the idea of one Sahrawi representative of the 
civil society organization in Laayoune. According to him, the most important negotiation 
should be the one amongst Sahrawis, instead of the one between Moroccan authority and the 
Polisario. He has been conscious of the gap within Sahrawi ethnic unity; therefore, he 
suggests that Sahrawi –both in Laayoune and Tindouf– should discuss a solution of the 
Western Sahara issue before the Polisario speak out as a representative of Sahrawi national 
unity. After 38 years of diaspora, it cannot be denied that their political opinion might go in 
different directions and it has been a trigger for the confrontation within the ethnic unity as 
“super-family” structure. 
 Nevertheless, I must point out the positive movement within the Sahrawi unity too. 
As the Gdeim Izik case shows, Sahrawi people are seeking a better solution to avoid 
confusion, even though they are caught by a dilemma whether they should stand up with arms 
to fight for their right of self-determination or they must keep cease-fire condition. As two 
respondents told me, the Gdeim Izik event did not reach to the worse circumstance, because 
the negotiation between the Sahrawi (the demonstrators in the Gdeim Izik camp and the 
military force) helped calm down the situation. They are quite aware of the consequence of 
armed conflict. Despite facing a hopeless condition; corruption of the local authority, distrust 
toward Moroccan government, disappointment to the international society, financial difficulty 
in the daily life and fear for arresting, Sahrawi chose to throw arms in Gdeim Izik.  
 So, what is the problem here? I describe it in figure 20. I divided the Sahrawi‟s 
political opinions into three categories. The first one is the group who accepted the Moroccan 
rule; therefore, they have a Moroccan national identity while they keep Sahrawi ethnic 
identity. The second group is the one who would accept the autonomous plan under the 
Moroccan sovereignty. They seek the Sahrawi national unity and have different national 
identity from Moroccan one. The last one is the Sahrawi people who claim total independence 
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as a nation-state. Needless to say, their national identity corresponds with ethnic identity. As 
we see here, there are two different political opinions within the same national unity. The 
second group and the third one do not share the same political idea for the future status of 
Western Sahara. At this point, the dilemma prevails within the Sahrawi national unity. 
Furthermore, as the representative of civil society organization which I mentioned above said, 








 I will now discuss this paper in order to explain the complicated character of the 
Western Sahara problem. The dispute has a root in colonization and the international situation. 
Controversy over the colonial boundary is one of the main causes of the conflict. 
“Nation-states” in the Maghreb (at least at the beginning) were born with the respect of the 
colonial boundary; however, the decolonization of Western Sahara could not pass the same 
road as other states did. It was used to create “Moroccan nationalism” by the Green March, at 
the same time, powerful states, for example the United States and France, supported 
pro-Western Moroccan regime under the Cold War condition. As a result of that, Spanish 
authority, who was under pressure of the United States, gave up the decolonization process of 
Western Sahara and ended its rule at almost the same time as General Franco‟s death. In 
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addition, because international organization, including the United Nations and the African 
Union, could not play sufficient roles to solve the problem, Sahrawi have been still divided 
between the refugee camp and the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara for more than 
38 years, and they are waiting for the resolution. Regional hegemony dispute between 
Morocco and Algeria, geo-political interests of the super-powers, Moroccan internal 
socio-political situation, economic interests (particularly phosphate) in Western Sahara and 
the inadequate role of the international organizations make the situation more complicated. 
 After understanding the character of the Western Sahara problem, I begin to analyze 
my research question, “is it possible to say that one‟s political opinion could change one‟s 
national identity? If the answer were yes, what is the cause to shift one‟s national identity?” 
For obtaining the answer to the question, I refer to the theory from Anthony Smith “National 
Identity (1991)”. According to him, ethnie is formalized by both a “primordial” and a 
“situational” quality. The common cultural groups which are generally composed of 
“super-families” structure (for example, clan) create an ethnie when they faced with political 
pressure from the outside. Then, based on the ethnie, nation as a political community is 
formalized when it recognizes the necessity of autonomous structure to protect the groups. 
Generally, because nations seek their own sovereignty as an independent state, it is confused 
with the “nation-state”. Based on those definitions, I discuss how the national boundary is 
drawn. Taking into account of the multi-dimensional character of national identity, the 
national boundary can be shifted depending on the purpose of the intellectuals or nationalists. 
“Why do we struggle?” and “who is our enemy?”, the answers to those questions define the 
national identity. Furthermore, nationalism which is based on the strength of national identity 
could even harm real family ties. It was clearly illustrated to David‟s picture, “Oath of the 
Horatii”.  
 Based on the interview method, I conducted my field work in Las Palmas in Spain, 
Laayoune in Western Sahara and Marrakech in Morocco. For explaining the choice of 
national identity and citizenship, I introduced the case of Aminatou Haidar. It shows that the 
contradiction between “actual” Moroccan administer power and the international legal status 
of Western Sahara as non-self-governing territory produce confusion, because Moroccan 
government provides the passports which have an international legal function to people who 
live under non-self-governing area. As the Moroccan official said, a person who holds a 
Moroccan passport is automatically recognized as a Moroccan citizen as well as a Moroccan 
national. However, some Sahrawi who live under the Moroccan rule obtain the Moroccan 
passport (because there are no ways to obtain other passports), but they do not share the idea 
of national identity as Moroccans. At this point, the contradiction is occurred.  
 The passport issue has brought up the question of nationality. After thirty-eight years 
of the unsolved conflict situation, each Sahrawi chooses his/her nationality depending on the 
individual life history, experience, and actual economic condition. One might be able to 
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accept the Moroccan rule over Western Sahara, and he or she has transformed his/her 
nationality into Moroccan one while keeping Sahrawi ethnic identity. Another will say he or 
she can accept the Moroccan autonomous plan; however, he or she would not change the idea 
of his/her national identity as Sahrawi. Moreover, other Sahrawi fight for the right of 
self-determination and total independence of Western Sahara, so they also stay within the 
boundary of Sahrawi national unity.  
 One Sahrawi respondent said “we are tired enough of the situation, we would accept 
the autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty if the government could provide fair system”. If 
the Moroccan authority can provide equal citizen right and a stable socio-economic condition, 
and respect each ethnie and its culture, some Sahrawi‟s national identity would be 
transformed to Moroccan one, or at least some Sahrawi can accept the autonomous condition 
within the Moroccan sovereignty. For example, according to the “Autonomous Region of 
Sahara” which Moroccan government suggested in 2003, natural resources, police and justice 
correspond to the Kingdom of Morocco, instead of Western Sahara autonomous government. 
This is just a small example which local Sahrawi do not feel as a “real” autonomous system. 
Whether Sahrawi can accept the suggestion or not depends on how much the Moroccan 
government can compromise to reach an autonomous system which Sahrawi will accept. 
Because nation is a political community, only political approach can change the situation. 
 Sahrawi people have been waiting for a solution for more than 38 years. One 
Sahrawi man from Tindouf showed me a bottle containing the sand from the coast of 
Laayoune. He said this smell of the sand brought back the memory of Laayoune. They did not 
choose to live in the harsh conditions of the middle of the great desert. But they cannot go 
“home” until they see a solution of the issue. As we see here, only a political approach can 
bring a solution. It means that not only Morocco and the Polisario, but also the 
former-colonial power Spain, “unofficial” supporters of Morocco, the United States, France 
and EU, and the international community should seek a political solution of the Western 










1884   Spain places Western Sahara under its protection by the treaty with the local  clan 
1912   Final Convention defines Spanish and French Zone in Western Sahara 
 France places Morocco under its protection 
1956   Morocco obtains independence by “Maghreb” Nationalism 
1958   Spain returns Spanish Southern Morocco (Tarfaya region) to Morocco 
1961   King Hassan II becomes Moroccan sovereign after Mohammed V‟s death 
1962   Spain discovers huge amount of phosphate in Bou Kra‟a 
1963   Morocco attempts to occupy disputed border area of Algeria 
 Western Sahara was added to the list of none-self-government territories 
1965   The UN General Assembly first calls on Spain to decolonize Western Sahara 
1968   Sahrawi first liberation movement occurred by Mohammed Ibrahim Bassiri 
1969   Spain returns Ifni to Morocco 
1971   The first military Coup was attempted in Morocco 
1972   The second military Coup was occurred in Morocco 
1973   Sahrawi second liberation movement is begun by El-Ouali Mustapha Said 
 The Polisario Front is established 
1974   The Polisario announces the goal of total independence of Western Sahara 
 Morocco and Mauritania ask the question of Western Sahara to the ICJ 
1975   October: ICJ publish the advisory opinion on Western Sahara issue 
 November: Green March (Moroccan nationalism) is conducted 
 November: Madrid Accord signed by Morocco, Mauritania and Spain 
 November: General Franco dies 
 Almost half of the Sahrawi population refuge to Tindouf  
1976   January: Moroccan military crashes with Algerian troop in Amgala 
 February: Spain withdraw from Western Sahara 
 February: SADR is declared by the Polisario, the refugee camp is established 
 June: The leader of the Polisario El-Ouali Mustapha Said dies 
 August: Mohammed Abdelaziz elected Secretary-General of the Polisario 
1979   August: Mauritania agrees cease-fire with the Polisario 
 August: Morocco takes after the Mauritanian Western Sahara zone 
1981   Morocco builds the defensive wall (berm)  
1982   Morocco and the US reach 
1984 SADR becomes a member of the OAU 
 Morocco withdraws from the OAU 
1988   May: Morocco and Algeria re-establish diplomatic relation 
 August: Pérez de Cuéllar proposes the Settlement Plan, both Morocco and the 
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 Polisario accept it 
1989   January: The Marrakech Direct Talk between Hassan II and the Polisario Front 
 February: Maghreb Arab Union is found 
1991   April: MINURSO is found 
 September: Morocco and the Polisario reach to Cease-fire 
1997   James Baker becomes a United Nation Special Representative in Western Sahara, 
 Morocco and the Polisario agreed with the Huston Accords 
1999   July: Hassan II dies, Mohammed VI enthrones 
 December: Voter list is completed for the referendum 
2001   May: James Baker introduces “Baker Plan I”, the Polisario and Algeria reject 
2003  January: James Baker introduces “Baker Plan II”, the Polisario surprisingly 
accepts the plan, but Morocco rejects and proposes the Autonomy for Western Sahara 
Plan 
2004   June: James Baker resigns 
 Peter Van Walsum is confirmed as the new UN Special Representative in 
 Western Sahara 
2005   The Polisario releases 404 of the Moroccan prisoner-of-war 
2006   US, Spain and France support the Autonomy for Western Sahara Plan 
2007   Both Morocco and the Polisario agree with the direct negotiation, Manhasset 
 Negotiations are hold four times 
2009   Christopher Ross is nominated as a UN Special Representative in Western Sahara 
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